风险共担与金融科技:以湘湖宝为例

Hanming Fang, X. Qin, Wenfeng Wu, Tong Yu
{"title":"风险共担与金融科技:以湘湖宝为例","authors":"Hanming Fang, X. Qin, Wenfeng Wu, Tong Yu","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3781998","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Xiang Hu Bao (XHB), meaning 'mutual treasury' in Chinese, is a novel online mutual aid platform operated by Alibaba's Ant Financial to facilitate mutual risk sharing of critical illness exposures. XHB reached nearly 100 million members in less than one year since its launch and so far has offered its members critical illness protections at significantly lower cost than traditional critical illness insurance. There are three major distinctions between XHB and traditional insurance products. First, XHB leverages the tech giant's platform and digital technology to lower enrollment and claim processing costs. Second, different from insurance applying sophisticated actuarial pricing models, XHB collects no premiums ex ante from members, but instead equally allocates indemnities and administrative costs among participants after each claims period. Third, XHB limits coverage amount, often below critical illness insurance products, particularly for older participants. We show this restriction potentially leads to separating equilibrium, a la Rothschild-Stiglitz, where low-risk individuals enroll in XHB while high-risk individuals purchase critical illness insurance. Data shows that the incidence rate of the covered illness among XHB members is well below that of comparable critical illness insurance. Our findings further suggest the role of advantageous selection in explaining the cost advantages of the Fintech-based mutual aid programs.","PeriodicalId":306152,"journal":{"name":"Risk Management eJournal","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-12-08","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Mutual Risk Sharing and Fintech: The Case of Xiang Hu Bao\",\"authors\":\"Hanming Fang, X. Qin, Wenfeng Wu, Tong Yu\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3781998\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Xiang Hu Bao (XHB), meaning 'mutual treasury' in Chinese, is a novel online mutual aid platform operated by Alibaba's Ant Financial to facilitate mutual risk sharing of critical illness exposures. XHB reached nearly 100 million members in less than one year since its launch and so far has offered its members critical illness protections at significantly lower cost than traditional critical illness insurance. There are three major distinctions between XHB and traditional insurance products. First, XHB leverages the tech giant's platform and digital technology to lower enrollment and claim processing costs. Second, different from insurance applying sophisticated actuarial pricing models, XHB collects no premiums ex ante from members, but instead equally allocates indemnities and administrative costs among participants after each claims period. Third, XHB limits coverage amount, often below critical illness insurance products, particularly for older participants. We show this restriction potentially leads to separating equilibrium, a la Rothschild-Stiglitz, where low-risk individuals enroll in XHB while high-risk individuals purchase critical illness insurance. Data shows that the incidence rate of the covered illness among XHB members is well below that of comparable critical illness insurance. Our findings further suggest the role of advantageous selection in explaining the cost advantages of the Fintech-based mutual aid programs.\",\"PeriodicalId\":306152,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Risk Management eJournal\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-12-08\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Risk Management eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3781998\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Risk Management eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3781998","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 2

摘要

湘狐宝(XHB)是阿里巴巴旗下蚂蚁金服运营的一个新颖的在线互助平台,旨在促进危重疾病风险的相互分担。XHB在推出不到一年的时间里就拥有了近1亿名会员,迄今为止,它为会员提供的重大疾病保障成本远低于传统的重大疾病保险。XHB与传统保险产品之间有三个主要区别。首先,XHB利用科技巨头的平台和数字技术来降低注册和索赔处理成本。其次,与采用复杂精算定价模型的保险不同,XHB不预先向会员收取保费,而是在每个索赔期之后在参与者之间平均分配赔偿和管理成本。第三,XHB限制保险金额,通常低于重大疾病保险产品,特别是对于老年参与者。我们表明,这种限制可能导致分离均衡,就像罗斯柴尔德-斯蒂格利茨(Rothschild-Stiglitz)那样,低风险个体参加XHB,而高风险个体购买重大疾病保险。数据显示,在XHB成员中,所涵盖疾病的发病率远低于可比的重大疾病保险。我们的研究结果进一步表明,优势选择在解释基于金融科技的互助计划的成本优势方面的作用。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Mutual Risk Sharing and Fintech: The Case of Xiang Hu Bao
Xiang Hu Bao (XHB), meaning 'mutual treasury' in Chinese, is a novel online mutual aid platform operated by Alibaba's Ant Financial to facilitate mutual risk sharing of critical illness exposures. XHB reached nearly 100 million members in less than one year since its launch and so far has offered its members critical illness protections at significantly lower cost than traditional critical illness insurance. There are three major distinctions between XHB and traditional insurance products. First, XHB leverages the tech giant's platform and digital technology to lower enrollment and claim processing costs. Second, different from insurance applying sophisticated actuarial pricing models, XHB collects no premiums ex ante from members, but instead equally allocates indemnities and administrative costs among participants after each claims period. Third, XHB limits coverage amount, often below critical illness insurance products, particularly for older participants. We show this restriction potentially leads to separating equilibrium, a la Rothschild-Stiglitz, where low-risk individuals enroll in XHB while high-risk individuals purchase critical illness insurance. Data shows that the incidence rate of the covered illness among XHB members is well below that of comparable critical illness insurance. Our findings further suggest the role of advantageous selection in explaining the cost advantages of the Fintech-based mutual aid programs.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:481959085
Book学术官方微信