商誉会计实务的经济影响:系统摊销与减值测试

José Antonio Cavero Rubio, Araceli Amorós Martínez, Antonio Collazo Mazón
{"title":"商誉会计实务的经济影响:系统摊销与减值测试","authors":"José Antonio Cavero Rubio, Araceli Amorós Martínez, Antonio Collazo Mazón","doi":"10.1080/02102412.2020.1778376","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"ABSTRACT Under IFRS, an impairment test is the only method applied to reduce goodwill. However, while the IASB have asked for comments about re-introducing the systematic amortisation method, European directives have already adopted its application. In this dual regulatory framework, we examine whether there are significant differences between the two methods that could affect the comparability of financial statements and their ability to faithfully represent the firm performance. Using a sample of 90 Spanish-listed firms over the period 2004–2011, the panel data technique and t-Student test confirm that under the impairment test, firms are likely to maintain higher amounts of goodwill and not recognise any impairment loss. Consequently, ROA and ROE are higher and leverage is lower. In addition, findings suggest that firms do not correctly implement this method to transmit private information about their economic situation. Results show that the better firm performance is the larger goodwill impairment will be.","PeriodicalId":244340,"journal":{"name":"Spanish Journal of Finance and Accounting / Revista Española de Financiación y Contabilidad","volume":"118 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-09-07","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"7","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Economic effects of goodwill accounting practices: systematic amortisation versus impairment test\",\"authors\":\"José Antonio Cavero Rubio, Araceli Amorós Martínez, Antonio Collazo Mazón\",\"doi\":\"10.1080/02102412.2020.1778376\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"ABSTRACT Under IFRS, an impairment test is the only method applied to reduce goodwill. However, while the IASB have asked for comments about re-introducing the systematic amortisation method, European directives have already adopted its application. In this dual regulatory framework, we examine whether there are significant differences between the two methods that could affect the comparability of financial statements and their ability to faithfully represent the firm performance. Using a sample of 90 Spanish-listed firms over the period 2004–2011, the panel data technique and t-Student test confirm that under the impairment test, firms are likely to maintain higher amounts of goodwill and not recognise any impairment loss. Consequently, ROA and ROE are higher and leverage is lower. In addition, findings suggest that firms do not correctly implement this method to transmit private information about their economic situation. Results show that the better firm performance is the larger goodwill impairment will be.\",\"PeriodicalId\":244340,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Spanish Journal of Finance and Accounting / Revista Española de Financiación y Contabilidad\",\"volume\":\"118 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-09-07\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"7\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Spanish Journal of Finance and Accounting / Revista Española de Financiación y Contabilidad\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1080/02102412.2020.1778376\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Spanish Journal of Finance and Accounting / Revista Española de Financiación y Contabilidad","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1080/02102412.2020.1778376","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 7

摘要

根据国际财务报告准则,减值测试是用于减少商誉的唯一方法。然而,尽管IASB已就重新引入系统性摊销法征求意见,但欧洲指令已采纳了该方法的应用。在这种双重监管框架中,我们研究了两种方法之间是否存在显著差异,这些差异可能会影响财务报表的可比性及其忠实反映公司业绩的能力。利用2004-2011年期间90家西班牙上市公司的样本,面板数据技术和t-Student检验证实,在减值测试下,公司可能会保持较高的商誉,而不承认任何减值损失。因此,ROA和ROE较高,杠杆率较低。此外,研究结果表明,企业没有正确地使用这种方法来传递有关其经济状况的私人信息。结果表明,企业业绩越好,商誉减值越大。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Economic effects of goodwill accounting practices: systematic amortisation versus impairment test
ABSTRACT Under IFRS, an impairment test is the only method applied to reduce goodwill. However, while the IASB have asked for comments about re-introducing the systematic amortisation method, European directives have already adopted its application. In this dual regulatory framework, we examine whether there are significant differences between the two methods that could affect the comparability of financial statements and their ability to faithfully represent the firm performance. Using a sample of 90 Spanish-listed firms over the period 2004–2011, the panel data technique and t-Student test confirm that under the impairment test, firms are likely to maintain higher amounts of goodwill and not recognise any impairment loss. Consequently, ROA and ROE are higher and leverage is lower. In addition, findings suggest that firms do not correctly implement this method to transmit private information about their economic situation. Results show that the better firm performance is the larger goodwill impairment will be.
求助全文
通过发布文献求助,成功后即可免费获取论文全文。 去求助
来源期刊
自引率
0.00%
发文量
0
×
引用
GB/T 7714-2015
复制
MLA
复制
APA
复制
导出至
BibTeX EndNote RefMan NoteFirst NoteExpress
×
提示
您的信息不完整,为了账户安全,请先补充。
现在去补充
×
提示
您因"违规操作"
具体请查看互助需知
我知道了
×
提示
确定
请完成安全验证×
copy
已复制链接
快去分享给好友吧!
我知道了
右上角分享
点击右上角分享
0
联系我们:info@booksci.cn Book学术提供免费学术资源搜索服务,方便国内外学者检索中英文文献。致力于提供最便捷和优质的服务体验。 Copyright © 2023 布克学术 All rights reserved.
京ICP备2023020795号-1
ghs 京公网安备 11010802042870号
Book学术文献互助
Book学术文献互助群
群 号:604180095
Book学术官方微信