{"title":"没有被感觉到的伤害","authors":"David Boonin","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198842101.003.0002","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter provides an extensive defense of the first premise of the book’s central argument: the claim that it is possible for an act to wrongfully harm a person while they are alive even if the act has no effect on the person’s conscious experiences. The chapter begins by offering a series of thought experiments designed to motivate this claim, including a version of Nozick’s famous experience machine. It then identifies a series of objections that can be raised against the use of such thought experiments in support of this claim and argues that all of them can be successfully overcome.","PeriodicalId":141623,"journal":{"name":"Dead Wrong","volume":"1990 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2019-10-17","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Unfelt Harm\",\"authors\":\"David Boonin\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/oso/9780198842101.003.0002\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This chapter provides an extensive defense of the first premise of the book’s central argument: the claim that it is possible for an act to wrongfully harm a person while they are alive even if the act has no effect on the person’s conscious experiences. The chapter begins by offering a series of thought experiments designed to motivate this claim, including a version of Nozick’s famous experience machine. It then identifies a series of objections that can be raised against the use of such thought experiments in support of this claim and argues that all of them can be successfully overcome.\",\"PeriodicalId\":141623,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Dead Wrong\",\"volume\":\"1990 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2019-10-17\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Dead Wrong\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198842101.003.0002\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Dead Wrong","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198842101.003.0002","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
This chapter provides an extensive defense of the first premise of the book’s central argument: the claim that it is possible for an act to wrongfully harm a person while they are alive even if the act has no effect on the person’s conscious experiences. The chapter begins by offering a series of thought experiments designed to motivate this claim, including a version of Nozick’s famous experience machine. It then identifies a series of objections that can be raised against the use of such thought experiments in support of this claim and argues that all of them can be successfully overcome.