客观旨趣、关系确证与道德客观主义的推定

T. Hammond
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摘要

在其他条件相同的情况下,道德经验的客观特征是否能支持某种形式的道德客观主义的假设?Don Loeb(2007)认为,即使我们承认道德经验似乎向我们展示了一个客观道德事实的领域——他否认我们首先有理由这样做——道德经验的客观目的本身甚至不能为道德客观主义提供初步的支持。在接下来的文章中,我反对勒布的观点,即给予普通道德经验的客观主张足以使一个假定的案例转向道德客观主义,这是通过构成非解释性的、关系性的确认来逐步提高道德事实存在的初步可能性。更具体地说,我呼吁可能性主义者和贝叶斯主义者共享的一个适度的确认原则,即弱可能性定律,以努力表明(I)至少,给予道德经验的客观目的,为道德客观主义为真的充分条件(但不是必要条件)建立了一个中等可理解的概率;而(ii)这种适度的概率反过来又构成了证据,使得至少某种形式的道德客观主义更有可能是正确的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Objective Purport, Relational Confirmation, and the Presumption of Moral Objectivism
All else being equal, can an objective-seeming character of moral experience support a presumption in favor of some form of moral objectivism? Don Loeb (2007) has argued that even if we grant that moral experience appears to present us with a realm of objective moral facts—something he denies we have reason to do in the first place—the objective purport of moral experience cannot by itself provide even prima facie support for moral objectivism. In what follows, I contend against Loeb that granting the objective purport of ordinary moral experience is sufficient to shift a presumptive case in favor of moral objectivism, and this by constituting non-explanatory, relational confirmation that incrementally raises the prima facie probability that moral facts exist. More specifically, I appeal to a modest confirmational principle shared by Likelihoodists and Bayesians—namely, the Weak Law of Likelihood—in an effort to show that (i) at a minimum, granting the objective purport of moral experience establishes a middling scrutable probability for a sufficient but not necessary condition of moral objectivism being true, and that (ii) this moderate probability in turn constitutes evidence that makes it prima facie more probable than not that at least some form of moral objectivism is true.
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