Fengbin An, Chunyi Huang, Kangping Li, Chengmin Wang
{"title":"考虑点对点交易的用户侧储能站动态容量共享模型","authors":"Fengbin An, Chunyi Huang, Kangping Li, Chengmin Wang","doi":"10.1109/FES57669.2023.10182705","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Existing energy storage capacity sharing adopts a fixed capacity allocation for some time, and the flexible needs of users still need to be satisfied. To fully exploit the regulation capacity of energy storage, a novel dynamic sharing business model for the user-side energy storage station is proposed, where centralized capacity sharing and peer-to-peer (P2P) transactions of scheduling right are considered. The business model can be described as a two-stage game process, where the Stackelberg game is firstly carried out between shared energy storage (SES) and prosumers to transact leasing capacity of energy storage, and a non-cooperative game is conducted among prosumers to further share the charging and discharging scheduling right. Considering the behavior of prosumers, a bi-level model is formulated to realize the interaction between SES and prosumers. The upper-level SES sets the leasing price of storage capacity to prosumers with the goal of maximum profits, while the lower-level prosumer provides leasing capacity and power schedule to SES. Besides, prosumers trade peer-to-peer scheduling rights between them. Such a Stackelberg game with one leader and N followers is an NP-hard problem and challenging to solve. A generalized Nash equilibrium solution method based on the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions with approximations is proposed for solving the solution of the business model. The case study verifies that the user-side energy storage business model proposed in this paper has a more considerable profit margin than the traditional fixed capacity sharing model and effectively improves the efficiency of idle energy storage utilization.","PeriodicalId":165790,"journal":{"name":"2023 International Conference on Future Energy Solutions (FES)","volume":"41 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2023-06-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A Dynamic Capacity Sharing Model for User-side Energy Storage Station Considering Peer-to-peer Transactions\",\"authors\":\"Fengbin An, Chunyi Huang, Kangping Li, Chengmin Wang\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/FES57669.2023.10182705\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Existing energy storage capacity sharing adopts a fixed capacity allocation for some time, and the flexible needs of users still need to be satisfied. To fully exploit the regulation capacity of energy storage, a novel dynamic sharing business model for the user-side energy storage station is proposed, where centralized capacity sharing and peer-to-peer (P2P) transactions of scheduling right are considered. The business model can be described as a two-stage game process, where the Stackelberg game is firstly carried out between shared energy storage (SES) and prosumers to transact leasing capacity of energy storage, and a non-cooperative game is conducted among prosumers to further share the charging and discharging scheduling right. Considering the behavior of prosumers, a bi-level model is formulated to realize the interaction between SES and prosumers. The upper-level SES sets the leasing price of storage capacity to prosumers with the goal of maximum profits, while the lower-level prosumer provides leasing capacity and power schedule to SES. Besides, prosumers trade peer-to-peer scheduling rights between them. Such a Stackelberg game with one leader and N followers is an NP-hard problem and challenging to solve. A generalized Nash equilibrium solution method based on the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions with approximations is proposed for solving the solution of the business model. The case study verifies that the user-side energy storage business model proposed in this paper has a more considerable profit margin than the traditional fixed capacity sharing model and effectively improves the efficiency of idle energy storage utilization.\",\"PeriodicalId\":165790,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2023 International Conference on Future Energy Solutions (FES)\",\"volume\":\"41 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-06-12\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2023 International Conference on Future Energy Solutions (FES)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/FES57669.2023.10182705\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2023 International Conference on Future Energy Solutions (FES)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/FES57669.2023.10182705","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
A Dynamic Capacity Sharing Model for User-side Energy Storage Station Considering Peer-to-peer Transactions
Existing energy storage capacity sharing adopts a fixed capacity allocation for some time, and the flexible needs of users still need to be satisfied. To fully exploit the regulation capacity of energy storage, a novel dynamic sharing business model for the user-side energy storage station is proposed, where centralized capacity sharing and peer-to-peer (P2P) transactions of scheduling right are considered. The business model can be described as a two-stage game process, where the Stackelberg game is firstly carried out between shared energy storage (SES) and prosumers to transact leasing capacity of energy storage, and a non-cooperative game is conducted among prosumers to further share the charging and discharging scheduling right. Considering the behavior of prosumers, a bi-level model is formulated to realize the interaction between SES and prosumers. The upper-level SES sets the leasing price of storage capacity to prosumers with the goal of maximum profits, while the lower-level prosumer provides leasing capacity and power schedule to SES. Besides, prosumers trade peer-to-peer scheduling rights between them. Such a Stackelberg game with one leader and N followers is an NP-hard problem and challenging to solve. A generalized Nash equilibrium solution method based on the Karush-Kuhn-Tucker (KKT) conditions with approximations is proposed for solving the solution of the business model. The case study verifies that the user-side energy storage business model proposed in this paper has a more considerable profit margin than the traditional fixed capacity sharing model and effectively improves the efficiency of idle energy storage utilization.