Guilherme Bueno, Mateus Saquetti, J. Azambuja, Weverton Cordeiro
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Defending lightweight virtual switches from cross-app poisoning attacks with vIFC
We present vIFC, a conceptual architecture for Information Flow Control (IFC) policy enforcement in lightweight programmable data planes (PDP) virtualization solutions. In contrast to existing solutions for preventing Cross-App Poisoning Attacks (CAP) like ProvSDN, our solution can monitor and prevent CAP attacks launched against lightweight virtual switches emulated by a general-purpose switch program or composed in a single switch program.
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