滥用司法覆核

Rosalind Dixon, David E. Landau
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引用次数: 3

摘要

本章解释了滥用司法审查的概念:政权利用法院来实现反民主的宪法变革。滥用司法审查涉及两种不同意义上的滥用宪法:首先,政权依靠被俘获或恐吓的法院作为合法化或推进专制目标的策略,其次,这些法院经常以滥用的方式利用自由民主理论。它发展了这一现象的两种不同形式的类型学——一种是弱形式,法院支持政治行为者的专制行为,另一种是强形式,法院更直接地采取行动,消除专制计划的障碍。最后,它列举了两个主要的例子:委内瑞拉最高法院使用“立法遗漏”原则和其他工具镇压反对派控制的立法机构,以及柬埔寨和泰国最高法院运用激进的民主理论来禁止政党以达到独裁目的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Abusive Judicial Review
This chapter explains the concept of abusive judicial review: the use of courts by regimes to achieve anti-democratic constitutional change. Abusive judicial review involves abusive constitutional borrowing in two distinct senses: first, regimes lean on captured or cowed courts as a strategy to legitimate or advance authoritarian goals, and second, those courts often draw upon liberal democratic doctrines in abusive ways. It develops a typology of two different forms of the phenomenon—a weak form where courts uphold authoritarian moves by political actors, and a strong form where they act more directly to remove obstacles to authoritarian programs. Finally, it draws out two main examples: the Venezuelan Supreme Court’s repression of the opposition-held legislature using a doctrine of ‘legislative omission’ and other tools, and the wielding of militant democracy doctrines by the Cambodian and Thai apex courts to ban parties for authoritarian ends.
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