在做出过早的上市决定后,后续融资的成本有多高?

Paul P. Momtaz
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引用次数: 0

摘要

企业家通常将首次公开募股(ipo)视为非常成功的创业之旅的顶峰,因此对创业融资的研究很少超越上市决策。这一研究差距很重要,因为许多ipo后的企业家在未能在公开市场筹集到额外股本的情况下,需要回到ipo前的企业家投资者那里,在私人交易中进行后续融资。ipo前的投资关系通常是互惠互利的,而ipo后交易的租金共享则不那么明显。2001年至2018年期间,近期ipo公司的私募股权投资(pipe)的证据表明,租金分担高度不对称。在pipe实施后的第一年,企业家的回报率最高可达-15%,而投资者则因能够决定交易条款而受益。我们发现一些证据表明,公司治理和信息不对称的考虑在回报的横截面上很重要。对于那些仍然担任上市公司首席执行官、个人财富很大一部分与公司股票挂钩的企业家来说,这一结果具有真正的意义。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
How costly is follow-on financing after premature going-public decisions?
Entrepreneurs often regard Initial Public Offerings (IPOs) as the crowning pinnacle at the end of a highly successful entrepreneurial journey, and studies in entrepreneurial finance therefore rarely extend beyond the going-public decision. This research gap is important because many post-IPO entrepreneurs need to revert to their pre-IPO entrepreneurial investors for follow-on financing in private transactions as they fail to raise additional equity in public markets. While the investment relationship is usually mutually beneficial pre-IPO, the rent sharing in post-IPO transactions is less obvious. Evidence from Private Investments in Public Equity (PIPEs) over the 2001-2018 period in recent-IPO firms suggests highly asymmetric rent sharing. Entrepreneurs earn a negative return of up to -15% in the first post-PIPE year, while investors benefit due to the ability to dictate transaction terms. We find some evidence that corporate governance and asymmetric information considerations matter in the cross section of the returns. The results have real implications for entrepreneurs who often remain CEO of the public company and have a large portion of their personal wealth tied to their company stock.
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