软嵌入式FPGA结构自顶向下物理设计

P. Mohan, Oguz Atli, Onur O. Kibar, Mohammed Zackriya, Larry Pileggi, K. Mai
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引用次数: 9

摘要

近年来,集成电路逆向工程和集成电路制造供应链安全已经成为设计师、系统集成商和最终客户面临的重大经济和安全威胁。一旦攻击者通过逆向工程或不受信任的制造设施访问设计网络列表,许多现有的逻辑锁定和混淆技术就很容易受到攻击。我们介绍了软嵌入式FPGA编码器,这是一种硬件混淆方法,允许设计人员用可合成的eFPGA结构替换设计中的安全关键IP块。该方法完全隐藏了关键IP的逻辑和路由,并与标准ASIC流兼容,便于集成和过程可移植性。为了演示eFPGA编校,我们混淆了一个RISC-V控制路径和一个GPS p码生成器。我们还表明,改进的网络列表具有中等VLSI开销的SAT攻击弹性。安全的RISC-V设计具有1.89倍的面积和2.36倍的延迟开销,而GPS设计在工业22nm FinFET CMOS工艺上实现时具有1.39倍的面积和可忽略不计的延迟开销。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Top-down Physical Design of Soft Embedded FPGA Fabrics
In recent years, IC reverse engineering and IC fabrication supply chain security have grown to become significant economic and security threats for designers, system integrators, and end customers. Many of the existing logic locking and obfuscation techniques have shown to be vulnerable to attack once the attacker has access to the design netlist either through reverse engineering or through an untrusted fabrication facility. We introduce soft embedded FPGA redaction, a hardware obfuscation approach that allows the designer substitute security-critical IP blocks within a design with a synthesizable eFPGA fabric. This method fully conceals the logic and the routing of the critical IP and is compatible with standard ASIC flows for easy integration and process portability. To demonstrate eFPGA redaction, we obfuscate a RISC-V control path and a GPS P-code generator. We also show that the modified netlists are resilient to SAT attacks with moderate VLSI overheads. The secure RISC-V design has 1.89x area and 2.36x delay overhead while the GPS design has 1.39x area and negligible delay overhead when implemented on an industrial 22nm FinFET CMOS process.
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