一种硬件木马检测方法

P. Kitsos, A. Voyiatzis
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引用次数: 18

摘要

恶意硬件是一个现实的威胁。早在制造硅产品之前,就有可能将恶意功能插入到设备的硬件设计流程中。为了开发一种硬件特洛伊木马检测方法,我们分析了现有技术的能力和局限性,制定了一种有效发现大规模生产集成电路中硬件特洛伊木马的测试策略。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Towards a hardware Trojan detection methodology
Malicious hardware is a realistic threat. It can be possible to insert the malicious functionality on a device as deep as in the hardware design flow, long before manufacturing the silicon product. Towards developing a hardware Trojan horse detection methodology, we analyze capabilities and limitations of existing techniques, framing a testing strategy for uncovering efficiently hardware Trojan horses in mass-produced integrated circuits.
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