{"title":"一种硬件木马检测方法","authors":"P. Kitsos, A. Voyiatzis","doi":"10.1109/MECO.2014.6862687","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Malicious hardware is a realistic threat. It can be possible to insert the malicious functionality on a device as deep as in the hardware design flow, long before manufacturing the silicon product. Towards developing a hardware Trojan horse detection methodology, we analyze capabilities and limitations of existing techniques, framing a testing strategy for uncovering efficiently hardware Trojan horses in mass-produced integrated circuits.","PeriodicalId":416168,"journal":{"name":"2014 3rd Mediterranean Conference on Embedded Computing (MECO)","volume":"151 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2014-06-15","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"18","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Towards a hardware Trojan detection methodology\",\"authors\":\"P. Kitsos, A. Voyiatzis\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/MECO.2014.6862687\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Malicious hardware is a realistic threat. It can be possible to insert the malicious functionality on a device as deep as in the hardware design flow, long before manufacturing the silicon product. Towards developing a hardware Trojan horse detection methodology, we analyze capabilities and limitations of existing techniques, framing a testing strategy for uncovering efficiently hardware Trojan horses in mass-produced integrated circuits.\",\"PeriodicalId\":416168,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2014 3rd Mediterranean Conference on Embedded Computing (MECO)\",\"volume\":\"151 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2014-06-15\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"18\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2014 3rd Mediterranean Conference on Embedded Computing (MECO)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/MECO.2014.6862687\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2014 3rd Mediterranean Conference on Embedded Computing (MECO)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/MECO.2014.6862687","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Malicious hardware is a realistic threat. It can be possible to insert the malicious functionality on a device as deep as in the hardware design flow, long before manufacturing the silicon product. Towards developing a hardware Trojan horse detection methodology, we analyze capabilities and limitations of existing techniques, framing a testing strategy for uncovering efficiently hardware Trojan horses in mass-produced integrated circuits.