基于进化博弈的企业内部知识共享激励机制分析

Yang Liu
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引用次数: 1

摘要

基于企业员工是理性有限的假设,建立了企业内部知识共享的演化博弈模型。通过计算得到模型的进化稳定点。通过对稳定点位置的分析,找出企业内部知识共享激励机制设计应关注的关键因素。本文的主要论点是,适当的激励机制和适当的聚焦因素可以使企业的知识共享向企业管理者满意的状态发展。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
An Analysis of Knowledge Sharing Incentive Mechanism inside the Enterprise Based on Evolutionary Game
Based on the supposition that enterprise employees are rationality-bounded, this paper establishes an evolutionary game model of knowledge sharing inside enterprise. We can get the evolutionary stable point of the model by calculation. By the analysis of the position of the stable point, we can find out the key factors which should be focused upon during the design of knowledge sharing incentive mechanism inside the enterprise. We submit a major argument that an appropriate incentive mechanism with the proper focusing factors could make the knowledge sharing of an enterprise evolve toward a state which is satisfied by enterprise managers.
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