纪念Mzee: 1958-2010年“肯雅塔日”的制作与再制作

Ed Goodman
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In the early hours of the morning of 20 October 1952, British security services in Kenya set in motion the plan codenamed “Operation Jock Scott,” a strategy devised over the course of the previous few days, with the intention of decapitating the so-called Mau Mau movement.1 The rounding-up of around 150 Kenya African Union (KAU) activists would, it was hoped, leave the movement rudderless, allowing security services the opportunity to regain control in the increasingly fraught circumstances of Kenya’s Central Province and Rift Valley. At the top of the list (and by the time of his arrest, apparently aware of what was coming) was the name of Jomo Kenyatta, leader of the KAU, author of Facing Mount Kenya, and future president of independent Kenya.2 So began the Emergency, which was to last eight long years. The roundup was followed by a show trial of Kenyatta and five other men, Fred Kubai, Bildad Kaggia, Paul Ngei, Kungu Karumba and Achieng’ Oneko, ac For an introduction to successive understandings of Mau Mau, see John Lonsdale, “Foreword,” in Mau Mau from Below, ed. Greet Kershaw (Oxford: James Currey, 1997), xvi–xxx.  On Operation Jock Scott, see David Anderson, Histories of the Hanged: Britain’s Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire (London: W.W. Norton, 2005), 62–63. For an introduction to the tense situation in Central Province and the Rift Valley, see Ch.1. See also David Throup, Economic and Social Origins of Mau Mau (London: James Currey, 1987); Daniel Branch, Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya: Counterinsurgency, Civil War, and Decolonisation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); and Gabrielle Lynch, I Say to You: Ethnic Politics and the Kalenjin in Kenya (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), Chs. 1–2. 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He had done so, the judge claimed, in order to turn back the “progress that had been made” under colonial tutelage “towards an enlightened civilisation” amongst his people, preying on “the primitive instincts which you know lie deep down in their characters,” plunging these dupes “back to a state which shows little of humanity,” and persuading them “in secret to murder, to burn and to commit evil atrocities which it will take,” the judge gravely intoned, “many years to forget.” Convinced of his guilt, Thacker sentenced Kenyatta, and the other five, to seven years’ hard labour.3 The future president was to remain in detention until August 1961. Over the course of the last 60 years, it has been the movement that Kenyatta was convicted (quite wrongly) of managing that has stood “[a]t the heart of Kenya’s modern history.”4 Mau Mau has been the central concern of those interested in the question of how “a conscious sense of the past, as something meaningfully connected to the present, is sustained and developed within human individuals and human cultures,” the imperative – etched onto the memorial to the self-declared state of Somaliland’s experience of war under General Siad Barre, and described in this volume by Mohamed Haji Ingriis – to “respect and remember.”5 Marshall Clough, for example, has traced “the elusive, chang Judgement of the Crown vs. Jomo Kenyatta et al, [1952], Court of the Resident Magistrate at Kapenguria, 8 April 1953, 97–98. On Kenyatta’s trial, see John Lonsdale, “Kenyatta’s Trials: Breaking and Making an African Nationalist,” in The Moral World of the Law, ed. Peter Coss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 196–239; and Anderson, Histories, 65–68. On imaginations of Mau Mau more generally, see John Lonsdale, “Mau Mau’s of the Mind: Making Mau Mau and Remaking Kenya,” Journal of African History 31, no. 3 (1990): 393–421.  John Lonsdale, “The Moral Economy of Mau Mau,” in Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa, Book Two, ed. Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale (Oxford: James Curry, 1992), 467.  Geoffrey Cubitt, History and Memory (Manchester: Manchester University, Press 2007), 9. On Somaliland, see Mohamed Haji Ingriis in this volume. On the imperative to remember, and the need to forget, see also David Rieff, In Praise of Forgetting: Historical Memory and its Ironies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016). On the postcolonial legacy of Mau Mau, see Nicholas K. Githuku,Mau Mau Crucible of War: Statehood, National Identity and the Politics of Postcolonial Kenya (London: Lexington Book, 2016). 78 Edward Goodman","PeriodicalId":149530,"journal":{"name":"The Politics of Historical Memory and Commemoration in Africa","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Remembering Mzee: The Making and Re-making of “Kenyatta Day,” 1958–2010\",\"authors\":\"Ed Goodman\",\"doi\":\"10.1515/9783110655315-005\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"While a concern with memory, in particular of the Mau Mau rebellion, has a well-established place in Kenya’s historiography, little attention has yet been paid to the postcolonial Kenyan state’s official memory regime, to what Kenya’s citizens have been asked to remember. The following chapter aims to fill this gap. It traces the origins of “Kenyatta Day,” celebrated from 1964 onwards on 20 October each year, and the four successive stories that were told about it by first its proponents, figures associated with the KANU government and the state, and then its critics in parliament and civil society whose attainment of power led to the re-dedication of the day as “Heroes Day” in 2010, when Kenya’s “Second Republic” was inaugurated by a new constitution. In the early hours of the morning of 20 October 1952, British security services in Kenya set in motion the plan codenamed “Operation Jock Scott,” a strategy devised over the course of the previous few days, with the intention of decapitating the so-called Mau Mau movement.1 The rounding-up of around 150 Kenya African Union (KAU) activists would, it was hoped, leave the movement rudderless, allowing security services the opportunity to regain control in the increasingly fraught circumstances of Kenya’s Central Province and Rift Valley. At the top of the list (and by the time of his arrest, apparently aware of what was coming) was the name of Jomo Kenyatta, leader of the KAU, author of Facing Mount Kenya, and future president of independent Kenya.2 So began the Emergency, which was to last eight long years. The roundup was followed by a show trial of Kenyatta and five other men, Fred Kubai, Bildad Kaggia, Paul Ngei, Kungu Karumba and Achieng’ Oneko, ac For an introduction to successive understandings of Mau Mau, see John Lonsdale, “Foreword,” in Mau Mau from Below, ed. Greet Kershaw (Oxford: James Currey, 1997), xvi–xxx.  On Operation Jock Scott, see David Anderson, Histories of the Hanged: Britain’s Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire (London: W.W. Norton, 2005), 62–63. For an introduction to the tense situation in Central Province and the Rift Valley, see Ch.1. 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He had done so, the judge claimed, in order to turn back the “progress that had been made” under colonial tutelage “towards an enlightened civilisation” amongst his people, preying on “the primitive instincts which you know lie deep down in their characters,” plunging these dupes “back to a state which shows little of humanity,” and persuading them “in secret to murder, to burn and to commit evil atrocities which it will take,” the judge gravely intoned, “many years to forget.” Convinced of his guilt, Thacker sentenced Kenyatta, and the other five, to seven years’ hard labour.3 The future president was to remain in detention until August 1961. 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引用次数: 0

摘要

虽然对记忆的关注,尤其是对茅茅叛乱的关注,在肯尼亚的史学中占有一席之地,但人们对后殖民时期肯尼亚政府的官方记忆制度,以及肯尼亚公民被要求记住的东西,却很少关注。下一章旨在填补这一空白。它追溯了“肯雅塔日”的起源,从1964年开始,每年10月20日庆祝“肯雅塔日”,并讲述了四个连续的故事,首先是它的支持者,与卡努联盟政府和国家有关的人物,然后是议会和民间社会的批评者,他们获得权力导致2010年肯尼亚“第二共和国”通过新宪法成立时,这一天被重新定为“英雄日”。1952年10月20日凌晨,驻肯尼亚的英国安全部门启动了代号为“乔克·斯科特行动”的计划,这是前几天制定的一项战略,目的是消灭所谓的茅茅运动对大约150名肯尼亚非洲联盟(KAU)积极分子的围捕,原本是希望让运动失去方向,让安全部门有机会重新控制肯尼亚中部省和裂谷日益紧张的局势。排在名单首位的是乔莫·肯雅塔(在他被捕的时候,他显然已经意识到了即将发生的事情),他是KAU的领导人,《面对肯雅山》的作者,也是独立后的肯尼亚未来的总统。总结之后是对肯雅塔和另外五个人的审判,他们是Fred Kubai, Bildad Kaggia, Paul Ngei, Kungu Karumba和Achieng ' Oneko,网址:关于对茅茅的连续理解的介绍,见John Lonsdale,“前言”,来自下面的茅茅,编辑。Greet Kershaw(牛津:James Currey, 1997), xvi-xxx。关于乔克·斯科特行动,见大卫·安德森,《被绞死者的历史:英国在肯尼亚的肮脏战争和帝国的终结》(伦敦:W.W.诺顿出版社,2005),第62-63页。关于中部省和东非大裂谷紧张局势的介绍,见第1章。参见David throp,《茅茅的经济和社会起源》(伦敦:James Currey出版社,1987);丹尼尔·布兰奇,《打败茅茅,创造肯尼亚:平叛、内战和非殖民化》(剑桥:剑桥大学出版社,2009年);加布里埃尔·林奇,《我对你说:肯尼亚的种族政治和卡伦津人》(芝加哥:芝加哥大学出版社,2011),第1-2页。OpenAccess。©2022 Edward Goodman, De Gruyter出版。本作品采用知识共享署名4.0国际许可协议。https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110655315-005是由殖民国家“管理”茅茅造成的。肯尼亚前高等法院法官和斐济总检察长兰斯利·塞克尔(Ransley Thacker)从退休中恢复过来主持此案,他说,肯雅塔是茅茅运动背后的“主心腹”,是他“在这片土地上释放了大量痛苦和不幸,影响了所有种族的日常生活,”他明确表示,“包括你们自己的人民。”他坚持认为,KAU的领导人充分利用了他所拥有的“权力和影响力”,据塞克尔说,这是他从20世纪30年代初到40年代中期在英国生活的教育和长期融入英国社会的产物。法官声称,他这样做是为了逆转在殖民统治下“在他的人民中”向着“开明文明”所取得的“进步”,掠夺“你知道深藏在他们性格深处的原始本能”,让这些被愚弄的人“回到一个没有人性的状态”,并说服他们“秘密地谋杀,焚烧和犯下邪恶的暴行,”法官严肃地说,“要很多年才能忘记。”由于确信肯雅塔有罪,塞克尔判处肯雅塔和其他五人七年苦役这位未来的总统被关押到1961年8月。在过去的60年里,肯雅塔被判(相当错误地)管理的运动一直是“肯尼亚现代史的核心”。“对过去的有意识的感觉,作为与现在有意义的联系的东西,如何在人类个体和人类文化中得到维持和发展”是那些对这个问题感兴趣的人关注的中心问题,“尊重和记住”是刻骨铭心的——索马里兰在西亚德·巴雷将军(Siad Barre)领导下的战争经历的自我宣布的国家的纪念碑,穆罕默德·哈吉·英格里斯(Mohamed Haji Ingriis)在这本书中描述了这一点。5例如,马歇尔·克拉夫(Marshall Clough)追溯了“难以捉摸的《关于君主对乔莫·肯雅塔等人的判决》[1952],卡彭古里亚地方法院,1953年4月8日,第97-98页。”关于肯雅塔的审判,见约翰·朗斯代尔,《肯雅塔的审判:打破和造就一个非洲民族主义者》,《法律的道德世界》主编。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Remembering Mzee: The Making and Re-making of “Kenyatta Day,” 1958–2010
While a concern with memory, in particular of the Mau Mau rebellion, has a well-established place in Kenya’s historiography, little attention has yet been paid to the postcolonial Kenyan state’s official memory regime, to what Kenya’s citizens have been asked to remember. The following chapter aims to fill this gap. It traces the origins of “Kenyatta Day,” celebrated from 1964 onwards on 20 October each year, and the four successive stories that were told about it by first its proponents, figures associated with the KANU government and the state, and then its critics in parliament and civil society whose attainment of power led to the re-dedication of the day as “Heroes Day” in 2010, when Kenya’s “Second Republic” was inaugurated by a new constitution. In the early hours of the morning of 20 October 1952, British security services in Kenya set in motion the plan codenamed “Operation Jock Scott,” a strategy devised over the course of the previous few days, with the intention of decapitating the so-called Mau Mau movement.1 The rounding-up of around 150 Kenya African Union (KAU) activists would, it was hoped, leave the movement rudderless, allowing security services the opportunity to regain control in the increasingly fraught circumstances of Kenya’s Central Province and Rift Valley. At the top of the list (and by the time of his arrest, apparently aware of what was coming) was the name of Jomo Kenyatta, leader of the KAU, author of Facing Mount Kenya, and future president of independent Kenya.2 So began the Emergency, which was to last eight long years. The roundup was followed by a show trial of Kenyatta and five other men, Fred Kubai, Bildad Kaggia, Paul Ngei, Kungu Karumba and Achieng’ Oneko, ac For an introduction to successive understandings of Mau Mau, see John Lonsdale, “Foreword,” in Mau Mau from Below, ed. Greet Kershaw (Oxford: James Currey, 1997), xvi–xxx.  On Operation Jock Scott, see David Anderson, Histories of the Hanged: Britain’s Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire (London: W.W. Norton, 2005), 62–63. For an introduction to the tense situation in Central Province and the Rift Valley, see Ch.1. See also David Throup, Economic and Social Origins of Mau Mau (London: James Currey, 1987); Daniel Branch, Defeating Mau Mau, Creating Kenya: Counterinsurgency, Civil War, and Decolonisation (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); and Gabrielle Lynch, I Say to You: Ethnic Politics and the Kalenjin in Kenya (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2011), Chs. 1–2. OpenAccess. © 2022 Edward Goodman, published by De Gruyter. This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110655315-005 cused by the colonial state of “managing” Mau Mau. Kenyatta, according to Ransley Thacker, a former Kenyan High Court Judge and Attorney-General of Fiji, brought out of retirement to preside over the case, was the “master mind” behind Mau Mau, the man who had “let loose upon this land a flood of misery and unhappiness affecting the daily lives of all the races in it, including,” he made clear, “those of your own people.” The KAU’s leader, he insisted, had taken “fullest advantage of the power and influence” which he held, the product, according to Thacker, of his education and long immersion in British society, where he had lived from the early 1930s to the mid-1940s. He had done so, the judge claimed, in order to turn back the “progress that had been made” under colonial tutelage “towards an enlightened civilisation” amongst his people, preying on “the primitive instincts which you know lie deep down in their characters,” plunging these dupes “back to a state which shows little of humanity,” and persuading them “in secret to murder, to burn and to commit evil atrocities which it will take,” the judge gravely intoned, “many years to forget.” Convinced of his guilt, Thacker sentenced Kenyatta, and the other five, to seven years’ hard labour.3 The future president was to remain in detention until August 1961. Over the course of the last 60 years, it has been the movement that Kenyatta was convicted (quite wrongly) of managing that has stood “[a]t the heart of Kenya’s modern history.”4 Mau Mau has been the central concern of those interested in the question of how “a conscious sense of the past, as something meaningfully connected to the present, is sustained and developed within human individuals and human cultures,” the imperative – etched onto the memorial to the self-declared state of Somaliland’s experience of war under General Siad Barre, and described in this volume by Mohamed Haji Ingriis – to “respect and remember.”5 Marshall Clough, for example, has traced “the elusive, chang Judgement of the Crown vs. Jomo Kenyatta et al, [1952], Court of the Resident Magistrate at Kapenguria, 8 April 1953, 97–98. On Kenyatta’s trial, see John Lonsdale, “Kenyatta’s Trials: Breaking and Making an African Nationalist,” in The Moral World of the Law, ed. Peter Coss (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2002), 196–239; and Anderson, Histories, 65–68. On imaginations of Mau Mau more generally, see John Lonsdale, “Mau Mau’s of the Mind: Making Mau Mau and Remaking Kenya,” Journal of African History 31, no. 3 (1990): 393–421.  John Lonsdale, “The Moral Economy of Mau Mau,” in Unhappy Valley: Conflict in Kenya and Africa, Book Two, ed. Bruce Berman and John Lonsdale (Oxford: James Curry, 1992), 467.  Geoffrey Cubitt, History and Memory (Manchester: Manchester University, Press 2007), 9. On Somaliland, see Mohamed Haji Ingriis in this volume. On the imperative to remember, and the need to forget, see also David Rieff, In Praise of Forgetting: Historical Memory and its Ironies (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016). On the postcolonial legacy of Mau Mau, see Nicholas K. Githuku,Mau Mau Crucible of War: Statehood, National Identity and the Politics of Postcolonial Kenya (London: Lexington Book, 2016). 78 Edward Goodman
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