&Apos; Outside&Apos;日本企业干预的决定因素及其对管理者的启示

S. Kaplan, Bernadette A. Minton
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引用次数: 24

摘要

本文估计了“外来者”——以前受雇于银行或其他非金融公司的董事——进入大型(非金融)日本公司董事会的决定因素。随着股票表现不佳,这两种“外部人士”的任命都会增加;银行外部人员的收入也随着当期收入的负增长而增加。银行外部人员的任命与公司债务水平有关;这两种类型的外部任命似乎都是有纪律的——高管流动率在同一年大幅上升。关于公司后续表现的其他证据表明,“银行”董事是在财务困境或合同公司任命的,而“公司”董事是在有暂时问题的公司任命的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
&Apos;Outside&Apos; Intervention in Japanese Companies: its Determinants and Implications for Mangers
This paper estimates the determinants of appointments of 'outsiders' -- directors previously employed by banks or other non-financial firms -- to the boards of large (non-financial) Japanese companies. Appointments of both types of 'outsiders' increase with poor stock performance; those of bank outsiders also increase with negative current income. Appointments of bank outsiders are related to firm debt levels; those of corporate outsiders, to shareholder concentration and group affiliation, Both types of outsider appointments appear to be disciplinary -- top executive turnover increase substantially in the same year. Additional evidence on subsequent firm performance suggests that "bank" directors are appointed in financially distressed or contracting firms, while "corporate" directors are appointed in firms with temporary problems.
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