{"title":"CEO更替与债券持有人财富","authors":"John C. Adams, S. Mansi","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.786687","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"We examine the impact of CEO turnover announcements on bondholder wealth, stockholder wealth, and overall firm value. Using publicly traded data for the period from 1973 to 2000, we find evidence consistent with both the wealth transfer and signaling hypotheses. Specifically, we find that CEO turnover events are associated with lower bondholder values, higher stockholder values, and that net changes in firm value are a function of turnover type (forced vs voluntary and outside vs inside firm replacements) and the riskiness of the firm's debt (investment vs non-investment grade). Overall, the results contribute to the understanding of the effects of corporate governance mechanisms, of which CEO turnover is an extreme form, on bondholders.","PeriodicalId":437258,"journal":{"name":"Corporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies","volume":"17 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2008-08-20","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"98","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"CEO Turnover and Bondholder Wealth\",\"authors\":\"John C. Adams, S. Mansi\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.786687\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"We examine the impact of CEO turnover announcements on bondholder wealth, stockholder wealth, and overall firm value. Using publicly traded data for the period from 1973 to 2000, we find evidence consistent with both the wealth transfer and signaling hypotheses. Specifically, we find that CEO turnover events are associated with lower bondholder values, higher stockholder values, and that net changes in firm value are a function of turnover type (forced vs voluntary and outside vs inside firm replacements) and the riskiness of the firm's debt (investment vs non-investment grade). Overall, the results contribute to the understanding of the effects of corporate governance mechanisms, of which CEO turnover is an extreme form, on bondholders.\",\"PeriodicalId\":437258,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Corporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies\",\"volume\":\"17 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2008-08-20\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"98\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Corporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.786687\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Corporate Finance: Capital Structure & Payout Policies","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.786687","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
We examine the impact of CEO turnover announcements on bondholder wealth, stockholder wealth, and overall firm value. Using publicly traded data for the period from 1973 to 2000, we find evidence consistent with both the wealth transfer and signaling hypotheses. Specifically, we find that CEO turnover events are associated with lower bondholder values, higher stockholder values, and that net changes in firm value are a function of turnover type (forced vs voluntary and outside vs inside firm replacements) and the riskiness of the firm's debt (investment vs non-investment grade). Overall, the results contribute to the understanding of the effects of corporate governance mechanisms, of which CEO turnover is an extreme form, on bondholders.
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