FA-LLLing for RSA:基于格的RSA加密与签名故障攻击

G. Barbu
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在CT-RSA 2022上,有证据表明,将格约简算法的能力与故障注入的能力相结合,不仅可以开辟新的攻击路径(如前所述),还可以铺平现有的攻击路径。实际上,使用错误的结果来构建隐数问题的实例,并最终解决它,可以允许攻击者考虑比以前更少的限制性错误模型。在本文中,我们将介绍使用这种方法对RSA加密和签名进行的两种新的错误攻击。我们的基于格子的攻击可以分别只需要2个错误的密文和签名就可以用32位随机错误模型来揭示隐藏的秘密。在故障模型频谱的另一端,我们的攻击仍然是成功的,考虑到一个非常宽松的故障模型,攻击者可以随机改变高达98%的目标值。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
FA-LLLing for RSA: Lattice-based Fault Attacks against RSA Encryption and Signature
At CT-RSA 2022, it was shown that combining the power of lattice reduction algorithms with that of fault injection allows not only to carve new attack paths, as previously known, but also to pave existing ones, so to speak. Indeed, using faulty results to build an instance of the Hidden Number Problem, and eventually solving it, can allow an attacker to consider less restrictive fault models than before. In this article, we introduce two new fault attacks on both RSA encryption and signature using this approach. Our lattice-based attack can require as few as 2 faulty ciphertexts and signatures respectively to reveal the hidden secrets with a 32-bit random fault model. At the other end of the fault model spectrum, our attack is still successful considering a very permissive fault model where the attacker can randomly alter up to 98% of the targeted value.
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