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引用次数: 0
摘要
本文在Richard A. Musgrave提出的价值商品概念的基础上,引入了准价值商品的概念。优质商品的资格标准是模糊的。准价值商品是在特殊利益或误解的影响下,通过公共选择获得政府保护和赞助的特殊情况。我声称,私人银行存款是一种准功绩商品,旨在满足公众对银行稳定和不间断地向金融体系提供家庭储蓄的需求。银行利益相关者联合其他社会和政治团体要求政府干预。它以政府支持的存款保护计划的形式变得制度化,该计划“推动”储户以可取的方式行事。政府在存款担保下承担隐性责任,但可能需要注入公共资金以维持该计划的运行。存款保护具有分配效应:福利被重新分配,有利于特殊利益群体。它的过早颁布在存款人和银行家中造成了巨大的道德风险。
Quasi-Merit Goods: The Concept and a Case Study of Private Bank Deposits
Relying on the merit goods concept developed by Richard A. Musgrave, this paper introduces the notion of quasi-merit good. The criteria of eligibility for merit goods are vague. Quasi-merit good constitutes a special case where government protection and sponsorship are obtained via public choice influenced by special interests or a misconception. I claim that private bank deposits are a quasi-merit good meant to satisfy the public want of bank stability and uninterrupted supply of household savings into the financial system. Bank stakeholders join with other social and political groups to demand government intervention. It becomes institutionalized in the shape of a government-backed deposit protection scheme that ‘nudges’ depositors to act in a desirable way. Government assumes an implicit liability under deposit guarantee, but may be required to inject public funds to keep the scheme running. Deposit protection has distributional effects: welfare is redistributed in favor of special interests. Its premature enactment generates massive moral hazard among depositors and bankers.