{"title":"标准化博弈中的收敛与振荡","authors":"E. Auriol, M. Benaïm","doi":"10.1051/EJESS:2001107","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Auriol and Benaim (2000) studied in a model inspired by evolutionary game theory, how standards and norms emerge in decentralized econ- omies when there are two standards. They showed that the decentralized adoption process always converges toward a stable equilibrium (possibly an incompatibility one). This paper explores the robustness of Auriol and Benaim (2000) convergence results. It shows that with more than two standards the decentralized adoption process does not necessarily converge. It can oscillate and describe cycles.","PeriodicalId":352454,"journal":{"name":"European Journal of Economic and Social Systems","volume":"40 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"4","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Convergence and Oscillation in Standardization Games\",\"authors\":\"E. Auriol, M. Benaïm\",\"doi\":\"10.1051/EJESS:2001107\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Auriol and Benaim (2000) studied in a model inspired by evolutionary game theory, how standards and norms emerge in decentralized econ- omies when there are two standards. They showed that the decentralized adoption process always converges toward a stable equilibrium (possibly an incompatibility one). This paper explores the robustness of Auriol and Benaim (2000) convergence results. It shows that with more than two standards the decentralized adoption process does not necessarily converge. It can oscillate and describe cycles.\",\"PeriodicalId\":352454,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"European Journal of Economic and Social Systems\",\"volume\":\"40 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1900-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"4\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"European Journal of Economic and Social Systems\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1051/EJESS:2001107\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"European Journal of Economic and Social Systems","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1051/EJESS:2001107","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Convergence and Oscillation in Standardization Games
Auriol and Benaim (2000) studied in a model inspired by evolutionary game theory, how standards and norms emerge in decentralized econ- omies when there are two standards. They showed that the decentralized adoption process always converges toward a stable equilibrium (possibly an incompatibility one). This paper explores the robustness of Auriol and Benaim (2000) convergence results. It shows that with more than two standards the decentralized adoption process does not necessarily converge. It can oscillate and describe cycles.
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