{"title":"用诚实信号的协同进化模拟模型增强博弈论","authors":"David Harris, S. Bullock","doi":"10.1109/CEC.2002.1004480","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Game-theoretic models provide a rigorous mathematical modelling framework, but tractability considerations keep them simple. In contrast, Evolutionary Simulation Models (ESMs) may be complex, but can lack rigour. We demonstrate that careful synthesis of the two techniques provides improved insights into the processes underlying the evolution of cooperative signalling systems.","PeriodicalId":184547,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings of the 2002 Congress on Evolutionary Computation. CEC'02 (Cat. No.02TH8600)","volume":"2 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2002-05-12","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"10","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Enhancing game theory with coevolutionary simulation models of honest signalling\",\"authors\":\"David Harris, S. Bullock\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/CEC.2002.1004480\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Game-theoretic models provide a rigorous mathematical modelling framework, but tractability considerations keep them simple. In contrast, Evolutionary Simulation Models (ESMs) may be complex, but can lack rigour. We demonstrate that careful synthesis of the two techniques provides improved insights into the processes underlying the evolution of cooperative signalling systems.\",\"PeriodicalId\":184547,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Proceedings of the 2002 Congress on Evolutionary Computation. CEC'02 (Cat. No.02TH8600)\",\"volume\":\"2 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2002-05-12\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"10\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Proceedings of the 2002 Congress on Evolutionary Computation. CEC'02 (Cat. No.02TH8600)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/CEC.2002.1004480\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings of the 2002 Congress on Evolutionary Computation. CEC'02 (Cat. No.02TH8600)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CEC.2002.1004480","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Enhancing game theory with coevolutionary simulation models of honest signalling
Game-theoretic models provide a rigorous mathematical modelling framework, but tractability considerations keep them simple. In contrast, Evolutionary Simulation Models (ESMs) may be complex, but can lack rigour. We demonstrate that careful synthesis of the two techniques provides improved insights into the processes underlying the evolution of cooperative signalling systems.