分享是关怀吗?共享云集群的激励机制分析

Talha Mehboob, Noman Bashir, M. Zink, David E. Irwin
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摘要

许多组织维护和操作大型共享计算集群,因为它们可以通过利用统计多路复用将计算成本分摊给所有用户,从而大大降低计算成本。重要的是,这种共享集群通常不是免费使用的,而是有一个内部定价模型来为其运营提供资金。由于许多大型组织(尤其是大学)的员工在购买决策上有一定的预算自主权,内部共享集群与云平台争夺用户的竞争日益激烈,云平台可能提供更低的成本和更好的性能。因此,许多组织正在将其共享集群转移到在云资源上运行。本文利用一个大型大学系统的大型共享集群的8年工作跟踪,实证分析了两种不同定价模型下共享云集群的用户激励。我们的分析表明,无论采用哪种定价模式,与直接从云平台获取资源相比,很大一部分用户几乎没有参与共享云集群的经济动机。虽然共享云集群可以通过打折利用保留的实例来提供有限的成本降低,但由于工作负载突发,实现这些降低通常需要施加较长的作业等待时间,对于许多用户来说,这可能不值得降低成本。特别是,我们展示了,如果用户的等待时间大于其平均作业运行时的15倍,那么超过80%的用户将退出共享集群,这将增加剩余用户的价格,从而消除参与共享集群的任何激励。因此,虽然共享云集群可能为用户提供其他好处,但它们的财务激励很弱。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Is Sharing Caring? Analyzing the Incentives for Shared Cloud Clusters
Many organizations maintain and operate large shared computing clusters, since they can substantially reduce computing costs by leveraging statistical multiplexing to amortize it across all users. Importantly, such shared clusters are generally not free to use, but have an internal pricing model that funds their operation. Since employees at many large organizations, especially Universities, have some budgetary autonomy over purchase decisions, internal shared clusters are increasingly competing for users with cloud platforms, which may offer lower costs and better performance. As a result, many organizations are shifting their shared clusters to operate on cloud resources. This paper empirically analyzes the user incentives for shared cloud clusters under two different pricing models using an 8-year job trace from a large shared cluster for a large University system. Our analysis shows that, with either pricing model, a large fraction of users have little financial incentive to participate in a shared cloud cluster compared to directly acquiring resources from a cloud platform. While shared cloud clusters can provide some limited reductions in cost by leveraging reserved instances at a discount, due to bursty workloads, realizing these reductions generally requires imposing long job waiting times, which for many users are likely not worth the cost reduction. In particular, we show that, assuming users defect from the shared cluster if their wait time is greater than 15x their average job runtime, over 80% of the users would defect, which increases the price of the remaining users such that it eliminates any incentive to participate in a shared cluster. Thus, while shared cloud clusters may provide users other benefits, their financial incentives are weak.
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