人、灵魂和死后的生命

Christopher Hauser
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引用次数: 2

摘要

§1。托马斯同质论的两个对立版本:腐败主义与生存主义我们每个人都明显地从事着各种各样的心理活动。对我们每个人来说,他或她现在都有一个身体也是显而易见的。但是,这个思考、感觉、记忆等等并现在有身体的实体是什么呢?更简单地说,我们是什么?什么是人?过去和现在的哲学家都对这个问题提出了各种不同的答案。在我们当代语境中所捍卫的理论中,有几个,包括托马斯的Hylomorphism,动物主义,宪政主义和新兴个人主义,可以在一个或另一个方面声称是“新亚里士多德主义”。本章将集中讨论当代新亚里士多德理论中的一种:托马斯同形说,这一理论受到托马斯·阿奎那关于我们是什么的同形说的启发,而阿奎那又受到亚里士多德关于我们是什么的同形说的启发。像其他词形学家一样,托马斯式词形学家坚持认为,人类是持久的个体,“由”或“由”(在术语的特定意义上)物质(hylk)和某种实质形式(morphk)组成。托马斯形态论者补充说,人类与其他物质的不同之处在于,人类有实体形式,可以在没有告知身体的情况下存在。采用亚里士多德对“灵魂”一词的用法,托马斯主义的灵魂形态论者称生物的实体形式为“灵魂”,称人类的实体形式为“智力(或理性或人类)灵魂”。为了本章的目的,我们可以将托马斯同形论定义为以下四个论点的结合:
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Persons, Souls, and Life After Death
§1. Two Rival Versions of Thomistic Hylomorphism: Corruptionism and Survivalism It is evident to each of us that he or she engages in a variety of mental activities. It is also evident to each of us that he or she presently has a body. But what is this entity which thinks, senses, remembers, etc. and presently has a body? Put more simply, what are we? What are human persons? Philosophers both past and present have proposed a variety of different answers to this question. Of the theories defended in our contemporary context, several, including Thomistic Hylomorphism, Animalism, Constitutionalism, and Emergent Individualism, can claim to be “neo-Aristotelian” in one respect or another. This chapter will focus on just one of these contemporary neo-Aristotelian theories: Thomistic Hylomorphism, a theory inspired by Thomas Aquinas’s hylomorphic account of what we are, which in turn was inspired by Aristotle’s hylomorphic account of what we are. Like other hylomorphists, Thomistic Hylomorphists maintain that human persons are enduring individuals “composed of” or “constituted from” (in a to be specified sense of the term) matter (hylē) and a certain kind of substantial form (morphē). Thomistic Hylomorphists add that human persons differ from other material substances in that human persons have substantial forms which can exist without informing a body. Adopting the Aristotelian use of the term “soul,” Thomistic Hylomorphists call the substantial forms of living things “souls” and the substantial forms of human persons “intellective (or rational or human) souls.” For the purposes of this chapter, we can define Thomistic Hylomorphism as the conjunction of the following four theses:
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