卡纳塔克邦地下水制度对减少负外部性、提高经济效率和福利的启示

K. R. Patil
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引用次数: 3

摘要

本文分析了地下水资源非正式制度安排所涉及的经济效益和成本在控制农场(非共享农民)的情况下。兄弟姐妹之间共享井水被认为是一种非正式的制度。因此,在卡纳塔克邦中部干旱地区,采用雪球抽样技术选取了30名共用井水的农民样本,采用简单随机抽样方法选取了17名农民样本。本研究估算了兄弟姐妹共用灌溉井水的交易成本和收益。采用带截距虚拟变量的线性回归方法估计了井水共享制度下地下水灌溉的边际生产力。利用最优控制理论对地下水的可持续开采路径进行了估计。结果表明,在集体行动中不存在交易成本,因为共享(一种集体行动形式,涉及将兄弟姐妹聚集在一起的成本,提供有关共享水的重要性的信息,以及关于共享井水和相应的可持续作物模式的说服成本,而不是钻新井,这可能导致原始井的水减少)是兄弟姐妹之间的交易成本。与不共享井水的农民相比,共享井水的农民的井失失率(23%)较低(后者的井失失率为46%);与不共享井的比例(54%)相比,具有更高的功能井比例(77%)。同样,他们的井龄也从8.68年延长到了12.32年;减少负外部性(Rs 1293每对Rs。6692),减少灌溉用水成本每英亩英尺每英亩(Rs 358英寸对Rs。每英亩599英寸)。共享井水的农民也实现了更高的每卢比运行井的净回报(2,79,795卢比对2,40,102卢比)和灌溉用水的净回报(10.83卢比对7.23卢比)。通过保持井深,井的寿命也可以延长45年,而不是8年。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
An Implication of Groundwater Institutions on Reducing Negative Externality, Enhancing Economic Efficiency and Welfare in Karnataka
The economic benefits and costs involved in an informal institutional arrangement of groundwater resource was analysed against control farm situation (non sharing farmers) in the present study. The sharing of well water among siblings was considered as an informal institution. Accordingly, a sample of thirty farmers sharing well water using snow ball sampling technique and a sample of seventeen farmers using simple random sampling were selected from central dry zone of Karnataka. In this study transaction costs and benefits of sharing water in irrigation well among siblings are estimated. The marginal productivity of groundwater irrigation due to the institution of sharing well water is estimated using linear regression with intercept dummy variable. The sustainable extraction path of groundwater is estimated using optimal control theory. The results indicated the absence of transaction cost in collective action, since sharing (a form of collective action which involves the cost of bringing siblings together providing information regarding importance of sharing water and the cost of convincing regarding sharing well water and the corresponding sustainable crop pattern, instead of drilling new well, which may result in reduced water in original well(s)) was among the siblings. Farmers who were sharing well water, experienced lower rate of failure of wells (23 per cent) when compared with farmers who were not sharing well water (for whom failure rate of wells was 46 per cent); had higher proportion of functioning wells (77 per cent) when compared with those not sharing (54 per cent). Similarly they experienced longer age of wells of 12.32 years, instead of 8.68 years; reduced negative externality (Rs. 1293 per well against Rs. 6692 per well), reduced cost of irrigation water per acre inch (Rs. 358 per acre inch against Rs. 599 per acre inch). Farmers who were sharing well water also realised higher net returns per rupee of functioning well (Rs.2,79,795 as against Rs.2,40,102) and net returns per rupee of irrigation water (Rs.10.83 against Rs. 7.23). The life of borewell could also enhance by 45 years instead of 8 years, by maintaining depth of wells.
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