基于Stackelberg博弈的零售商合作广告策略

Lei Jiang, Wei Chen
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引用次数: 2

摘要

本文研究了由制造商和零售商组成的一周期两阶段供应链在Stackelberg博弈中是否存在广告的问题。市场需求是不确定的,零售商是风险中性的,将产品从制造商销售给消费者。厂商和零售商进行Stackelberg博弈,得到两种情况下的纳什均衡,合作广告下的最优解和利润总是优于非合作广告下的最优解和利润,说明零售商进行合作广告的动机和策略。最后通过数值算例给出了灵敏度系数对最优决策的影响,并对结论进行了验证。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Retailer's Cooperative Advertising Strategy based on Stackelberg Game
This paper consider the question of whether the one-period two-stage supply chain, made up of a manufacturer and a retailer, is advertised in the Stackelberg game. Market demand is uncertain, the retailers are risk- neutral, and are selling products from manufacturers to consumers. The manufacturers and the retailers carry out Stackelberg game, the Nash equilibrium is obtained under two kinds of situations, the optimal solution and profit under the cooperative advertising is always better than that of the cooperative advertising is not the optimal solution and profits, tell the motive and strategy of the retailer cooperative advertising. Finally, the influence of the sensitivity coefficients on optimal decision is given by numerical examples, the conclusion is also proved.
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