{"title":"Stackelberg游戏在物理安全时友好使用波束形成干扰器","authors":"Xu Zhaoye, Lu Ruimin","doi":"10.1109/EIIS.2017.8298616","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"To improve the physical layer security in the wireless communication network with an eavesdropper and a friendly jammer, this paper make use of beamforming to aim the jamming signal's main lobe to the eavesdropper and to diminish the jamming signal to the destination node, improving the efficiency of jamming power usage. On this basis, we propose a power auction model, in which we regard the source node as the buyer and the destination node as the seller and build corresponding utility function respectively. Then by using a distributed algorithm, Stackelberg equilibrium can be reached, maximizing the system utility and obtaining the corresponding secrecy capacity.","PeriodicalId":434246,"journal":{"name":"2017 First International Conference on Electronics Instrumentation & Information Systems (EIIS)","volume":"46 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2017-06-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Stackelberg game in physical security when friendly jammers using beamforming\",\"authors\":\"Xu Zhaoye, Lu Ruimin\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/EIIS.2017.8298616\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"To improve the physical layer security in the wireless communication network with an eavesdropper and a friendly jammer, this paper make use of beamforming to aim the jamming signal's main lobe to the eavesdropper and to diminish the jamming signal to the destination node, improving the efficiency of jamming power usage. On this basis, we propose a power auction model, in which we regard the source node as the buyer and the destination node as the seller and build corresponding utility function respectively. Then by using a distributed algorithm, Stackelberg equilibrium can be reached, maximizing the system utility and obtaining the corresponding secrecy capacity.\",\"PeriodicalId\":434246,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2017 First International Conference on Electronics Instrumentation & Information Systems (EIIS)\",\"volume\":\"46 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2017-06-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2017 First International Conference on Electronics Instrumentation & Information Systems (EIIS)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/EIIS.2017.8298616\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2017 First International Conference on Electronics Instrumentation & Information Systems (EIIS)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/EIIS.2017.8298616","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Stackelberg game in physical security when friendly jammers using beamforming
To improve the physical layer security in the wireless communication network with an eavesdropper and a friendly jammer, this paper make use of beamforming to aim the jamming signal's main lobe to the eavesdropper and to diminish the jamming signal to the destination node, improving the efficiency of jamming power usage. On this basis, we propose a power auction model, in which we regard the source node as the buyer and the destination node as the seller and build corresponding utility function respectively. Then by using a distributed algorithm, Stackelberg equilibrium can be reached, maximizing the system utility and obtaining the corresponding secrecy capacity.