加纳公司的避税和盈余管理:融资策略重要吗?

M. Amidu, S. Yorke
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引用次数: 15

摘要

避税的代理视角认为,避税与盈余管理之间存在互补关系。因此,本文试图评估公司的财务政策如何影响企业避税(CTA)和盈余管理(EM)之间的关系,使用来自新兴和发展中国家的119家公司在2010-2013年的四年期间的样本。我们采用矩量系统方法(GMM),发现企业的融资结构对企业参与规避活动和/或管理其收益的激励作用不大。研究结果表明,依靠债务持有人提供的外部监控机制来监控管理层的转移行为,并不会导致与避税活动增加相关的新兴市场减少。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Tax avoidance and earnings management of firms in Ghana: does the funding strategy matter?
The agency perspective of tax avoidance suggests a complementary relationship between tax avoidance and earnings management. Thus, this paper seeks to evaluate how the firm's financial policy affects the relationship between corporate tax avoidance (CTA) and earnings management (EM) using a sample of 119 firms from emerging and developing countries over a four-year period 2010-2013. We employ system methods of moments (GMM) and find that the financing structure of a firm plays little role on the firm's incentives to engage in avoidance activities and/or manage their earnings. The results imply that monitoring managerial diversionary behaviour by relying on external monitoring mechanism provided by debt holders does not lead to a reduction in EM associated with increased tax avoidance activities.
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