{"title":"洛克的后续思想","authors":"Matthew Stuart","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198829294.003.0005","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Locke holds that there is a constant succession of ideas in the mind of each waking person. Section 1 asks whether Locke thinks of each succeeding idea as something that might persist for a while. The evidence pulls in two directions, and the puzzle is solved by distinguishing claims about idea tokens from claims about idea types. Section 2 unearths Locke’s fascinating account of why the rate at which our ideas succeed one another keeps us from seeing slow motions. Section 3 considers his views about our knowledge of the rate of idea succession. Finally, section 4 looks at Locke’s claim that we get the idea of succession by attending to the succession of our ideas and takes issue with Gideon Yaffe’s account of this.","PeriodicalId":322394,"journal":{"name":"Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy, Volume VIII","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2018-12-06","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Locke’s Succeeding Ideas\",\"authors\":\"Matthew Stuart\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/oso/9780198829294.003.0005\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Locke holds that there is a constant succession of ideas in the mind of each waking person. Section 1 asks whether Locke thinks of each succeeding idea as something that might persist for a while. The evidence pulls in two directions, and the puzzle is solved by distinguishing claims about idea tokens from claims about idea types. Section 2 unearths Locke’s fascinating account of why the rate at which our ideas succeed one another keeps us from seeing slow motions. Section 3 considers his views about our knowledge of the rate of idea succession. Finally, section 4 looks at Locke’s claim that we get the idea of succession by attending to the succession of our ideas and takes issue with Gideon Yaffe’s account of this.\",\"PeriodicalId\":322394,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy, Volume VIII\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2018-12-06\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy, Volume VIII\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198829294.003.0005\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Oxford Studies in Early Modern Philosophy, Volume VIII","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198829294.003.0005","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Locke holds that there is a constant succession of ideas in the mind of each waking person. Section 1 asks whether Locke thinks of each succeeding idea as something that might persist for a while. The evidence pulls in two directions, and the puzzle is solved by distinguishing claims about idea tokens from claims about idea types. Section 2 unearths Locke’s fascinating account of why the rate at which our ideas succeed one another keeps us from seeing slow motions. Section 3 considers his views about our knowledge of the rate of idea succession. Finally, section 4 looks at Locke’s claim that we get the idea of succession by attending to the succession of our ideas and takes issue with Gideon Yaffe’s account of this.