英国公司认可的品牌资产的价值相关性

Sanjay Kallapur, Sabrina Y. S. Kwan
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引用次数: 17

摘要

本研究考察了经理人对无形资产的任意估值是否与夸大无形资产的契约激励相关。我们通过研究1985年以来30家英国公司认可的品牌资产的价值相关性来做到这一点。我们的研究增加了关于无形资产价值相关性的文献,通过检查可能受合同激励而不是外部各方约束的经理的估值。我们增加了关于管理者的证据?通过明确划分合同激励措施的样本,并通过检查合同激励可能很强的情况,自由裁量(重新)估值。我们的研究结果表明,在财务报表中确认的品牌价值与股票价格资本化的价值以及未来的净收入有关,即使对于具有最大合同激励的公司,受伦敦证券交易所(LSE)规则影响的公司,要求股东批准收购/处置,以及高杠杆公司。这些发现对几个敏感性检查是可靠的。我们还发现适度的证据表明,合同激励对价值相关性有影响——对于没有任何交易、避免了伦敦证交所规则的公司,品牌资产与市值的相关系数更高。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Value Relevance of Brand Assets Recognized by UK Firms
This study examines whether managers discretionary valuations of intangible assets are relevant despite contracting incentives to over-state them. We do so by examining the value relevance of brand assets recognized by 30 UK firms beginning in 1985. Our study adds to the literature on the value-relevance of intangible assets by examining valuations of managers who could be subject to contracting incentives, rather than of outside parties. We add to the evidence on managers? discretionary (re)valuations by explicitly partitioning the sample on measures of contracting incentives, and by examining a situation where contracting incentives are likely strong. Our results suggest that brand values recognized in financial statements are associated with values capitalized in stock prices, and with future net income, even for firms with the greatest contracting incentives firms affected by the London Stock Exchange (LSE) rule requiring shareholder approval for acquisitions/disposals, and high-leverage firms. These findings are robust to several sensitivity checks. We also find modest evidence that contracting incentives have an effect on value-relevance the coefficient relating brand assets to market values are higher for firms without any transactions that avoided the LSE rule.
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