{"title":"《世界均势》,1939年3月","authors":"M. Wight","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780198848219.003.0007","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This essay surveys the political fluidity and antagonism in the triangular relationship among the main power groupings in March 1939—the Soviet Union, the Axis Powers (Germany, Italy, and Japan), and the Western Powers (Britain and France above all). Rather than focusing on their military capabilities and combat options, the essay concentrates on the ideas expressed in each camp—in the Western Powers, interest in the rule of law and constitutionalism; in the Axis Powers, ambitions for territorial acquisitions and increased might; and in the Soviet Union, the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary vision. In conjunction with this three-cornered dialogue, the essay examines factors in addition to ideas that influenced decision-making, including greed, coercion, resentments, power pressures, national egoisms, dependence on allies, and perceived security imperatives. Three combinations were hypothetically possible: a Nazi–Soviet alliance, a Soviet–Western alliance, or a Nazi–Western alliance. In August 1939, Nazi Germany offered the Soviet Union a non-aggression pact that enabled Moscow to seize territories in Eastern Europe and to limit its immediate involvement in combat. Nazi Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941 brought about a Soviet–Western alliance determined to defeat the Axis, despite the chasm between Soviet totalitarianism and Western democracy.","PeriodicalId":126645,"journal":{"name":"International Relations and Political Philosophy","volume":"13 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-12-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"The Balance of Power in The World in March 1939\",\"authors\":\"M. Wight\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/oso/9780198848219.003.0007\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This essay surveys the political fluidity and antagonism in the triangular relationship among the main power groupings in March 1939—the Soviet Union, the Axis Powers (Germany, Italy, and Japan), and the Western Powers (Britain and France above all). Rather than focusing on their military capabilities and combat options, the essay concentrates on the ideas expressed in each camp—in the Western Powers, interest in the rule of law and constitutionalism; in the Axis Powers, ambitions for territorial acquisitions and increased might; and in the Soviet Union, the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary vision. In conjunction with this three-cornered dialogue, the essay examines factors in addition to ideas that influenced decision-making, including greed, coercion, resentments, power pressures, national egoisms, dependence on allies, and perceived security imperatives. Three combinations were hypothetically possible: a Nazi–Soviet alliance, a Soviet–Western alliance, or a Nazi–Western alliance. In August 1939, Nazi Germany offered the Soviet Union a non-aggression pact that enabled Moscow to seize territories in Eastern Europe and to limit its immediate involvement in combat. Nazi Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941 brought about a Soviet–Western alliance determined to defeat the Axis, despite the chasm between Soviet totalitarianism and Western democracy.\",\"PeriodicalId\":126645,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"International Relations and Political Philosophy\",\"volume\":\"13 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-12-23\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"International Relations and Political Philosophy\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198848219.003.0007\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Relations and Political Philosophy","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198848219.003.0007","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
This essay surveys the political fluidity and antagonism in the triangular relationship among the main power groupings in March 1939—the Soviet Union, the Axis Powers (Germany, Italy, and Japan), and the Western Powers (Britain and France above all). Rather than focusing on their military capabilities and combat options, the essay concentrates on the ideas expressed in each camp—in the Western Powers, interest in the rule of law and constitutionalism; in the Axis Powers, ambitions for territorial acquisitions and increased might; and in the Soviet Union, the Marxist-Leninist revolutionary vision. In conjunction with this three-cornered dialogue, the essay examines factors in addition to ideas that influenced decision-making, including greed, coercion, resentments, power pressures, national egoisms, dependence on allies, and perceived security imperatives. Three combinations were hypothetically possible: a Nazi–Soviet alliance, a Soviet–Western alliance, or a Nazi–Western alliance. In August 1939, Nazi Germany offered the Soviet Union a non-aggression pact that enabled Moscow to seize territories in Eastern Europe and to limit its immediate involvement in combat. Nazi Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941 brought about a Soviet–Western alliance determined to defeat the Axis, despite the chasm between Soviet totalitarianism and Western democracy.