Harunobu Enami, Yuta Kodera, Takuya Kusaka, Y. Nogami
{"title":"在Arduino Uno上实现SIMON侧信道攻击的思考","authors":"Harunobu Enami, Yuta Kodera, Takuya Kusaka, Y. Nogami","doi":"10.1109/CANDARW53999.2021.00075","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"In this research, the authors conducted the side-channel attack (SCA)for the XOR in the final round of \"SIMON.\" As of 2021, there is no research about side-channel attacks against SIMON, which makes this paper more worthwhile. As a result, the authors could attack with little computational resources and time, which means that \"SIMON\" can be weak against side-channel attacks. Furthermore, the authors checked the relationship between the hamming-weight of the round key and the easiness of attacking. The authors confirmed that there was no relationship between them.","PeriodicalId":325028,"journal":{"name":"2021 Ninth International Symposium on Computing and Networking Workshops (CANDARW)","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2021-11-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Consideration of the side-channel attack to SIMON implemented on Arduino Uno\",\"authors\":\"Harunobu Enami, Yuta Kodera, Takuya Kusaka, Y. Nogami\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/CANDARW53999.2021.00075\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"In this research, the authors conducted the side-channel attack (SCA)for the XOR in the final round of \\\"SIMON.\\\" As of 2021, there is no research about side-channel attacks against SIMON, which makes this paper more worthwhile. As a result, the authors could attack with little computational resources and time, which means that \\\"SIMON\\\" can be weak against side-channel attacks. Furthermore, the authors checked the relationship between the hamming-weight of the round key and the easiness of attacking. The authors confirmed that there was no relationship between them.\",\"PeriodicalId\":325028,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2021 Ninth International Symposium on Computing and Networking Workshops (CANDARW)\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-11-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2021 Ninth International Symposium on Computing and Networking Workshops (CANDARW)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/CANDARW53999.2021.00075\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2021 Ninth International Symposium on Computing and Networking Workshops (CANDARW)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CANDARW53999.2021.00075","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Consideration of the side-channel attack to SIMON implemented on Arduino Uno
In this research, the authors conducted the side-channel attack (SCA)for the XOR in the final round of "SIMON." As of 2021, there is no research about side-channel attacks against SIMON, which makes this paper more worthwhile. As a result, the authors could attack with little computational resources and time, which means that "SIMON" can be weak against side-channel attacks. Furthermore, the authors checked the relationship between the hamming-weight of the round key and the easiness of attacking. The authors confirmed that there was no relationship between them.