股权结构、制度发展与政治抽离:来自中国的证据

Yuanto Kusnadi, Zhifeng Yang
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引用次数: 4

摘要

本文考察了股权结构和制度发展如何影响企业的流动性管理和投资政策,以应对中国的政治抽离威胁。首先,我们记录了由私营企业家控制的企业持有的现金储备少于国有企业的证据。此外,现金持有(投资)与经济机构的实力呈正(负)相关。结果与假设一致,即私营企业和位于制度较弱省份的企业的管理者有动机通过持有较少的现金(更容易提取)和追求更多的固定资产投资(更难提取)来保护他们的资产不被政治家征用。最后,我们发现与政客关系密切的公司会囤积现金储备,并显示出比没有关系的公司更低的投资。这表明,政治关系减轻了这些关联企业政治抽离的威胁。JEL分类:D23;H7;K0;P2
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Ownership Structure, Institutional Development, and Political Extraction: Evidence from China
This paper examines how ownership structure and institutional development influence the liquidity management and investment policies of firms, in response to the threat of political extraction in China. First, we document evidence that firms controlled by private entrepreneurs hold less cash reserves than their state-owned counterparts. In addition, cash holdings (investments) is positively (negatively) related to the strength of economic institutions. The results are consistent with the hypothesis that managers of private firms and firms located in provinces with weaker institutions have incentives to protect their assets from being expropriated by politicians, through holding less cash (which are easier to extract) and pursuing more investments in fixed assets (which are harder to extract). Finally, we find that firms with close connections to politicians hoard cash reserves and display lower investments than their non- connected counterparts. This suggests that political connections mitigate the threat of political extraction for those connected firms. JEL classification: D23; H7; K0; P2
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