Shantanu Banerjee, S. Dasgupta, Rui Shi, Jiali Yan
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引用次数: 0
摘要
研究表明,信息互补性在透明度冲击的溢出效应中起着重要作用。我们利用标准普尔500公司披露的财务不当行为,并在“堆叠差异-差异-差异”设计中,发现欺诈公司的“近”行业同行相对于“远”行业同行的隐含资本成本增加。当密切的同行和欺诈公司拥有共同的分析师覆盖范围和共同的机构所有权时,溢出效应尤其强烈,这已被证明是基本联系和信息互补性的有力代表。我们提供的证据表明,同行企业的资本成本增加至少部分是由于“贝塔冲击”(Lambert et al. [2007], Leuz and Schrand[2009])。密切的同行——特别是那些有共同报道和共同所有权联系的同行——在欺诈披露后也会增加。虽然在接下来的几年里,披露率仍然很高,但股权成本开始下降。这篇文章受版权保护。版权所有
Information Complementarities and the Dynamics of Transparency Shock Spillovers
We show that information complementarities play an important role in the spillover of transparency shocks. We exploit the revelation of financial misconduct by S&P 500 firms, and in a “Stacked Difference‐in‐Differences” design, find that the implied cost of capital increases for “close” industry peers of the fraudulent firms relative to “distant” industry peers. The spillover effect is particularly strong when the close peers and the fraudulent firm share common analyst coverage and common institutional ownership, which have been shown to be powerful proxies for fundamental linkages and information complementarities. We provide evidence that increase in the cost of capital of peer firms is due, at least in part, to “beta shocks” (Lambert et al. [2007], Leuz and Schrand [2009]). Disclosure by close peers – especially those with co‐coverage and co‐ownership links – also increases following fraud revelation. While disclosure remains high in the following years, the cost of equity starts to decrease.This article is protected by copyright. All rights reserved