Deontology and Deterrence for Free Will Deniers

Chapter 6: Deontology and Deterrence for Free Will Deniers Benjamin Vilhauer In this paper I outline what I take to be a solution to a problem about free will denial and the justification of punishment pointed out by Saul Smilansky (2011). Smilansky argues that free will deniers must acknowledge that some institution of punishment is necessary to maintain law and order, but since criminals do not deserve to be punished, it is unjust to punish them, and we therefore have a duty to compensate them. Since this is a great injustice, we must compensate them very heavily—in fact so heavily that the institution of punishment will cease to deter, and will instead become an incentive to commit crime. Previous responses to Smilansky’s “practical reductio” argument by Neil Levy (2012) and Derk Pereboom (2014) have emphasized consequentialist moral reasons. I advocate a deontological social contract approach to punishment which draws on Kantian and Rawlsian notions of treating criminals as ends by respecting their rational consent to punishment (Vilhauer 2013). In the course of explaining how my approach provides a response to Smilansky’s challenge, I will also respond to some objections to it from Pereboom.