{"title":"基于格的策略安全工程","authors":"C. Bryce","doi":"10.1109/CSFW.1997.596813","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Describes an algebraic approach to the security engineering of lattice policies. The approach has two main goals. First, it seeks to model access control policies with anti-symmetry, reflexivity and transitivity exceptions using a lattice, and to propose an information flow security definition for the resulting set of policies (POL). Second, it supports a constructive approach to policy specification through an algebraic structure (POL, AND, OR, NOT, /spl equiv/, /spl les/). This structure is homomorphic to Boolean algebra. The approach's goals and design decisions are influenced by the context in which it is being used: a library of reusable security components with tools to facilitate their reuse for securing application systems.","PeriodicalId":305235,"journal":{"name":"Proceedings 10th Computer Security Foundations Workshop","volume":"26 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1997-06-10","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"7","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Security engineering of lattice-based policies\",\"authors\":\"C. Bryce\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/CSFW.1997.596813\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Describes an algebraic approach to the security engineering of lattice policies. The approach has two main goals. First, it seeks to model access control policies with anti-symmetry, reflexivity and transitivity exceptions using a lattice, and to propose an information flow security definition for the resulting set of policies (POL). Second, it supports a constructive approach to policy specification through an algebraic structure (POL, AND, OR, NOT, /spl equiv/, /spl les/). This structure is homomorphic to Boolean algebra. The approach's goals and design decisions are influenced by the context in which it is being used: a library of reusable security components with tools to facilitate their reuse for securing application systems.\",\"PeriodicalId\":305235,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Proceedings 10th Computer Security Foundations Workshop\",\"volume\":\"26 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1997-06-10\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"7\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Proceedings 10th Computer Security Foundations Workshop\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.1997.596813\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Proceedings 10th Computer Security Foundations Workshop","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/CSFW.1997.596813","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Describes an algebraic approach to the security engineering of lattice policies. The approach has two main goals. First, it seeks to model access control policies with anti-symmetry, reflexivity and transitivity exceptions using a lattice, and to propose an information flow security definition for the resulting set of policies (POL). Second, it supports a constructive approach to policy specification through an algebraic structure (POL, AND, OR, NOT, /spl equiv/, /spl les/). This structure is homomorphic to Boolean algebra. The approach's goals and design decisions are influenced by the context in which it is being used: a library of reusable security components with tools to facilitate their reuse for securing application systems.