通信网络中不当行为威慑的最优惩罚

M. Awad, B. Zogheib, Hamed M. K. Alazemi
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引用次数: 0

摘要

任何网络中实体之间的通信都由通信协议中详细列出的一组规则和技术规范管理。所有通信实体都遵循相同的协议来成功交换数据。大多数规则以算法格式表示,该格式根据通信实体提供的一组输入或由中央控制器收集的一组输入计算决策。由于通信实体数量的增加和交换每个实体生成的输入集所需的大带宽,分布式实现有利于减少控制开销。在这样的实现中,每个实体自己计算关键的协议决策;因此,可以改变这些决定来获得协议管理的资源的不公平份额。行为不端的用户除了会让行为良好的用户挨饿之外,还会降低整个网络的性能。在这项工作中,我们开发了一个框架来推导惩罚行为不端的用户的最佳惩罚策略。该框架考虑了用户对检测机制技术的学习,以及检测机制对用户行为和协议违规历史的跟踪。分析表明,不断升级的惩罚对于阻止重复违反协议是最优的。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Optimal penalties for misbehavior deterrence in communication networks
The communication among entities in any network is administered by a set of rules and technical specifications detailed in the communication protocol. All communicating entities adhere to the same protocol to successfully exchange data. Most of the rules are expressed in an algorithm format that computes a decision based on a set of inputs provided by communicating entities or collected by a central controller. Due to the increasing number of communicating entities and large bandwidth required to exchange the set of inputs generated at each entity, distributed implementations have been favorable to reduce the control overhead. In such implementations, each entity self-computes crucial protocol decisions; therefore, can alter these decisions to gain unfair share of the resources managed by the protocol. Misbehaving users degrade the performance of the whole network in-addition to starving well-behaving users. In this work we develop a framework to derive the optimal penalty strategy for penalizing misbehaving users. The proposed framework considers users learning of the detection mechanism techniques and the detection mechanism tracking of the users behavior and history of protocol offenses. Analysis indicate that escalating penalties are optimal for deterring repeat protocol offenses.
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