委托的多面性:超越传统的住宿委托和其他经典案例

Y. Margalioth
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引用次数: 1

摘要

本文比较了社会用来提高工人福利的两种主要社会政策工具:强制福利和税收资助计划。它表明,规定的福利可能涉及与税收相同的经济效率低下(过度负担);而且它们往往会产生反常的再分配效应。根据劳伦斯·萨默斯(Lawrence Summers)关于强制福利的开创性论文之后的文献,强制福利被认为比税收资助的计划产生更少的扭曲。在本文中,我强调了这样一个事实,即这个想法背后的一个关键假设是,税收资助的项目有一个特殊的设计,即参与这些项目并不局限于员工。该条超越了被认为是扭曲讨论的经典案例(强制医疗保险与税收资助的政府提供的医疗保健),讨论了将非雇员排除在外似乎合理和合理的情况。这篇文章也超越了“传统的”迁就命令,研究了几个发人深思的案例,比如加班和养老金的归属(这就像迁就命令一样,但可能会产生相反的分配效应)。有趣的是,许多现实世界的任务不成比例地针对或有利于一个特定群体(例如男子),这是一个可以事先确定的离散的人口群体。然而,这种类型的调节指令不同于克里斯汀•乔尔斯(Christine Jolls)在其开创性著作《调节指令》(accommodation mandatory)中讨论的那些指令,因为它们并非政策制定者的本意,可能会以与社会通常认为理想的方向相反的方向重新分配财富。如果对工资和就业差异的限制没有约束力,那么与Jolls讨论的可能伤害其预期受益人的命令不同,这些命令恰恰是,如果对工资和就业差异的限制有约束力,我们通常想要重新分配的群体(妇女,薪酬较低的雇员)将会变得更糟。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
The Many Faces of Mandates: Beyond Traditional Accommodation Mandates and Other Classic Cases
The paper compares the two main social policy tools used by society to enhance the welfare of its workers: mandated benefits and tax financed programs. It shows that mandated benefits could involve economic inefficiency (excess burden) identical to that of taxes; and that they often have perverse redistribution effects. According to the literature that followed Lawrence Summers' seminal paper on mandated benefits, mandates are assumed to produce less distortion than tax financed programs. In this paper I stress the fact that a critical assumption behind this idea is that tax-financed programs have a particular design, namely, that participation in them is not limited to employees. The Article goes beyond what is considered to be the classic case in terms of the distortions discussion (mandated health insurance vs. tax financed government provided health care) to situations in which exclusion of non-employees seems plausible and sensible. This Article also goes beyond "traditional" accommodation mandates by looking at several thought provoking cases such as overtime and pension vesting (which turn out to be just like accommodation mandates, but with distributive effects running in the opposite direction potentially). Interestingly, a number of real-world mandates disproportionately target or benefit a particular group (e.g., men) that is a discrete demographic group that could be identified in advance. Nevertheless this type of accommodation mandates differs from those discussed by Christine Jolls's seminal work on Accommodation Mandates in that they are unintended by the policymaker and might redistribute wealth in the opposite direction of what society usually views as desirable. Unlike the mandates that Jolls discussed that could hurt their intended beneficiaries, if restrictions on wage and employment differentials were not binding, these mandates are ones in which, precisely if restrictions on wage and employment differentials bind, groups to whom we would normally want to redistribute (women, lower compensated employees) will be made worse off.
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