内在的Rowhammer puf:利用Rowhammer效应来提高安全性

André Schaller, Wenjie Xiong, N. Anagnostopoulos, Muhammad Umair Saleem, Sebastian Gabmeyer, S. Katzenbeisser, Jakub Szefer
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引用次数: 53

摘要

物理不可克隆功能(puf)已成为设备指纹、设备识别或密钥存储的重要且有前途的硬件原语。与外部硅puf不同,内部puf利用现有设备中已经存在的组件,外部硅puf基于涉及硬件修改的定制电路。在这项工作中,我们提出了一种基于内存的新型内在PUF,它利用了DRAM模块中的Rowhammer效应- Rowhammer PUF。我们的PUF利用位翻转,这是由于DRAM行的快速和重复访问而发生在DRAM单元中。先前的研究主要集中在Rowhammer攻击上,其中Rowhammer效应用于非法更改存储在内存中的数据,例如,更改页表项或启用特权升级攻击。同时,这是第一个在积极的背景下使用罗哈默效应的工作-设计一个新的PUF。我们使用商用,现成的设备广泛评估Rowhammer PUF,而不依赖于定制硬件或基于fpga的设置。评估表明,Rowhammer PUF拥有所设想的安全应用程序所需的属性,并且可以在今天部署。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Intrinsic Rowhammer PUFs: Leveraging the Rowhammer effect for improved security
Physically Unclonable Functions (PUFs) have become an important and promising hardware primitive for device fingerprinting, device identification, or key storage. Intrinsic PUFs leverage components already found in existing devices, unlike extrinsic silicon PUFs, which are based on customized circuits that involve modification of hardware. In this work, we present a new type of a memory-based intrinsic PUF, which leverages the Rowhammer effect in DRAM modules — the Rowhammer PUF. Our PUF makes use of bit flips, which occur in DRAM cells due to rapid and repeated access of DRAM rows. Prior research has mainly focused on Rowhammer attacks, where the Rowhammer effect is used to illegitimately alter data stored in memory, e.g., to change page table entries or enable privilege escalation attacks. Meanwhile, this is the first work to use the Rowhammer effect in a positive context — to design a novel PUF. We extensively evaluate the Rowhammer PUF using commercial, off-the-shelf devices, not relying on custom hardware or an FPGA-based setup. The evaluation shows that the Rowhammer PUF holds required properties needed for the envisioned security applications, and could be deployed today.
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