组织中的规则与自由裁量权

Susheng Wang
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引用次数: 0

摘要

是制定管理规则还是允许管理自由裁量权是组织中的一个关键问题。本文研究了企业规则与自由裁量权之间的界限。使用不完全合同方法,我们区分了在规则下更有效管理的项目和在自由裁量权下更有效管理的项目。我们的主要发现是,对于低支出和平衡支出/质量比的保守项目,规则比自由裁量更有效;对于其他项目,自由裁量权是有效的。我们还发现(1)规则提供了更好的激励;(2)自由裁量权更适用于高风险项目;(3)只要自由裁量权有效,规则也同样有效;(4)分配给经理的利润份额独立于经理的决策权(收益与控制权分离)。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Rules vs. Discretion in Organizations
Whether to set managerial rules or allow managerial discretion is a key issue in organizations. In this paper, we investigate the boundaries between rules and discretion in the firm. Using an incomplete contract approach, we differentiate between projects that are more efficiently managed under rules and those that are more efficiently managed under discretion. Our main finding is that for conservative projects with low expenditures and balanced expenditure/quality ratios, rules are more efficient than discretion; for other projects, discretion is efficient. We also find that (1) rules offer better incentives; (2) discretion works better for risky projects; (3) whenever discretion is efficient, rules are equally efficient; and (4) the profit share to the manager is independent of her decision-making rights (separation of income and control rights).
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