为社会主体建模人类的非理性行为

Jaroslaw Kochanowicz, A. Tan, D. Thalmann
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引用次数: 0

摘要

人类不是理性的生物。人类思维中对理性的偏离,目前有充分的文献记载[25],不能归结为对利己主义利益的理性追求,也不能归结为偶尔因暂时的情绪兴奋而产生的扭曲,正如人们通常认为的那样。这不仅发生在概念推理或理性目标实现之外,而且在潜意识中经常确定它们没有也不可能“在我的情况下”发生。非理性不再被视为理性思维中的一种罕见的情感异常,而是作为人类认知的一种系统的、永久的品质和“设计特征”。几十年来,社会心理学系统地研究了人类认知的非理性(包括其非情感方面)[63]。计算机科学的情况并非如此,尽管它与个人和群体行为建模明显相关。本文简要概述了与类人非理性建模相关的计算学科的工作,包括:社会信号处理、认知架构、情感计算、类人代理和规范多代理系统。它试图为这个极端跨学科的问题建立一个共同的术语和概念框架,揭示所讨论的模型和学科背后的非理性假设,它们目前的局限性和有助于解决的潜力。最后,还提出了可能的发展方向,希望有助于解决这一具有挑战性的问题。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Modeling human-like non-rationality for social agents
Humans are not rational beings. Deviations from rationality in human thinking are currently well documented [25] as non-reducible to rational pursuit of egoistic benefit or its occasional distortion with temporary emotional excitation, as it is often assumed. This occurs not only outside conceptual reasoning or rational goal realization but also subconsciously and often in certainty that they did not and could not take place 'in my case'. Non-rationality can no longer be perceived as a rare affective abnormality in otherwise rational thinking, but as a systemic, permanent quality, 'a design feature' of human cognition. While social psychology has systematically addressed non-rationality of human cognition (including its non-emotional aspects) for decades [63]. It is not the case for computer science, despite obvious relevance for individual and group behavior modeling. This paper proposes brief survey of work in computational disciplines related to human-like non-rationality modeling including: Social Signal Processing, Cognitive Architectures, Affective Computing, Human-Like Agents and Normative Multi-agent Systems. It attempts to establish a common terminology and conceptual frame for this extremely interdisciplinary issue, reveal assumptions about non-rationality underlying the discussed models and disciplines, their current limitations and potential in contributing to solution. Finally, it also presents ideas concerning possible directions of development, hopefully contributing to solution of this challenging issue.
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