战术改道

Ken Young, W. Schilling
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本章展示了争夺热核武器影响力的斗争如何进入新的领域,许多反对发展超级核武器决定的人通过国家安全政策的政治表达了他们的持续异议。同样的数字出现在空军战略轰炸理论的批评者和战略空军司令部的批评者中,战略空军司令部的应用被赋予了权利。在指出在陆战中更有效地使用核武器的前景时,持不同政见者获得了一些陆军军官的支持,而他们的观点却遭到了空军将领的诅咒。随着奥本海默和他的总顾问委员会的另一名成员控制了战术武器的研究,空军开始反对被视为危险的、可能具有颠覆性的业余行为。通过否认战略轰炸的威慑力量,推动一种被视为对战略空军司令部(SAC)的另一直接挑战的防空方法,使这种进攻更加复杂。就这样,奥本海默在原子能委员会人事安全委员会接受“审判”的道路上迈出了第一步。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Tactical Diversions
This chapter shows how the struggle for influence over thermonuclear weapons moved onto new territory, where many of those who had opposed the decision to develop the Super expressed their continuing dissent through the politics of national security policy. The same figures emerged as critics of the air force doctrine of strategic bombardment, and of Strategic Air Command, in which its application was vested. In pointing up the prospects for employing nuclear weapons more effectively in the land battle, the dissenters attracted some support from army officers, while their arguments were anathema to air force generals. As Oppenheimer and another member of his General Advisory Committee took control of a study of tactical weaponry, the air force began to move against what was seen as dangerous, possibly subversive, amateurism. The offense was compounded by the promotion of an approach to air defense that was seen as another direct challenge to Strategic Air Command (SAC) through a disavowal of the deterrent force of strategic bombardment. The first steps were thus taken on a path that would lead to Oppenheimer's “trial” before the Atomic Energy Commission's Personnel Security Board.
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