通过信任根的安装建立和维持系统完整性

Luke St. Clair, Joshua Schiffman, T. Jaeger, P. Mcdaniel
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引用次数: 27

摘要

完整性度量提供了一种方法,通过这种方法,分布式系统可以评估可能受到损害的远程主机的可靠性。然而,当前的测量技术只是断言软件的身份,而没有提供系统或其数据的持续状态的指示。因此,如果不仔细配置和管理系统,可能会产生许多重大漏洞。为了提高对系统完整性的管理,我们提出了一个信任根安装(ROTI)作为高完整性系统的基础。ROTI是一种可信的系统安装程序,它还断言它所安装的可信计算基础软件和数据的完整性,以便对系统进行直接、全面的完整性验证。ROTI解决了完整性度量中的一个历史限制问题:在异构的、不断发展的环境中确定构成可信系统状态的是什么。使用ROTI,高完整性系统状态由其安装程序定义,从而使远程方能够验证完整性保证近似经典完整性模型(例如Biba)。在本文中,我们研究了证明分布式安全体系结构(称为Shamon)的可信计算基础(sCore)的完整性所必需的条件。我们描述了自定义ROTI sCore安装程序的设计和实现,并研究了在分布式Shamon中将系统完整性与安装绑定的成本和有效性。这个演示表明,在管理开销有限的大型、多样化环境中,可以有效地实现强完整性保证。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Establishing and Sustaining System Integrity via Root of Trust Installation
Integrity measurements provide a means by which distributed systems can assess the trustability of potentially compromised remote hosts. However, current measurement techniques simply assert the identity of software, but provide no indication of the ongoing status of the system or its data. As a result, a number of significant vulnerabilities can result if the system is not configured and managed carefully. To improve the management of a system's integrity, we propose a Root of Trust Installation (ROTI) as a foundation for high integrity systems. A ROTI is a trusted system installer that also asserts the integrity of the trusted computing base software and data that it installs to enable straightforward, comprehensive integrity verification for a system. The ROTI addresses a historically limiting problem in integrity measurement: determining what constitutes a trusted system state in a heterogeneous, evolving environment. Using the ROTI, a high integrity system state is defined by its installer, thus enabling a remote party to verify integrity guarantees that approximate classical integrity models (e.g., Biba). In this paper, we examine what is necessary to prove the integrity of the trusted computing base (sCore) of a distributed security architecture, called the Shamon. We describe the design and implementation of our custom ROTI sCore installer and study the costs and effectiveness of binding system integrity to installation in the distributed Shamon. This demonstration shows that strong integrity guarantees can be efficiently achieved in large, diverse environments with limited administrative overhead.
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