{"title":"跨国企业是否利用了机会之窗?无约束条件下利润转移的实证分析","authors":"Carolin Holzmann, Christoph Wunder","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.3165968","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates multinational enterprises’ (MNEs) response to a unique window of opportunity for temporarily unrestricted profit shifting. The window unexpectedly opened because of a ruling by the European Court of Justice in 2006 that suspended the application of controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules within the European Economic Area. It closed with a subsequent piece of anti-shifting legislation on thin capitalization in 2007. We identify causal effects of the suspension of the CFC rules on profit shifting by exploiting random variation in the size of MNEs’ windows that results from variation in the business year starting dates across MNEs. Using detailed balance sheet information on internal debt shifting between foreign low tax subsidiaries and their parents, we find that MNEs’ response to the window of opportunity is remarkably moderate in terms of both the probability and the volume of internal lending. On the one hand, this results from substantial short-term rigidities: internal lending increases with window size. On the other hand, MNEs in general responded with a fair amount of reserve which is indicated by low total levels of internal lending throughout the window. Presumably, this is caused by legal uncertainty about the scope of internal debt shifting that would be accepted by tax offices.","PeriodicalId":385233,"journal":{"name":"FEN: Differences in Taxation & Corporate Finance (Topic)","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2017-02-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Do Multinational Enterprises Exploit a Window of Opportunity? An Empirical Analysis of Profit Shifting in the Absence of Restrictions\",\"authors\":\"Carolin Holzmann, Christoph Wunder\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.3165968\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper investigates multinational enterprises’ (MNEs) response to a unique window of opportunity for temporarily unrestricted profit shifting. The window unexpectedly opened because of a ruling by the European Court of Justice in 2006 that suspended the application of controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules within the European Economic Area. It closed with a subsequent piece of anti-shifting legislation on thin capitalization in 2007. We identify causal effects of the suspension of the CFC rules on profit shifting by exploiting random variation in the size of MNEs’ windows that results from variation in the business year starting dates across MNEs. Using detailed balance sheet information on internal debt shifting between foreign low tax subsidiaries and their parents, we find that MNEs’ response to the window of opportunity is remarkably moderate in terms of both the probability and the volume of internal lending. On the one hand, this results from substantial short-term rigidities: internal lending increases with window size. On the other hand, MNEs in general responded with a fair amount of reserve which is indicated by low total levels of internal lending throughout the window. Presumably, this is caused by legal uncertainty about the scope of internal debt shifting that would be accepted by tax offices.\",\"PeriodicalId\":385233,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"FEN: Differences in Taxation & Corporate Finance (Topic)\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2017-02-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"FEN: Differences in Taxation & Corporate Finance (Topic)\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3165968\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"FEN: Differences in Taxation & Corporate Finance (Topic)","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3165968","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
引用次数: 0
摘要
本文研究了跨国企业对暂时不受限制的利润转移的独特机会之窗的反应。2006年,欧洲法院(European Court of Justice)暂停了在欧洲经济区(European Economic Area)实施受控外国公司(CFC)规则的裁决,出人意料地打开了这扇窗口。2007年,它又通过了一项针对资本不足的反转移立法。我们通过利用跨国公司营业年度开始日期变化导致的跨国公司窗口大小的随机变化,确定暂停CFC规则对利润转移的因果影响。利用关于外国低税子公司与其母公司之间内部债务转移的详细资产负债表信息,我们发现跨国公司对机会之窗的反应在内部贷款的概率和数量方面都非常温和。一方面,这是由于大量的短期刚性:内部贷款随着窗口规模的扩大而增加。另一方面,跨国公司一般都有相当数量的储备,这从整个窗口期内的内部贷款总额较低可以看出。据推测,这是由于税务部门可以接受的内部债务转移范围的法律不确定性造成的。
Do Multinational Enterprises Exploit a Window of Opportunity? An Empirical Analysis of Profit Shifting in the Absence of Restrictions
This paper investigates multinational enterprises’ (MNEs) response to a unique window of opportunity for temporarily unrestricted profit shifting. The window unexpectedly opened because of a ruling by the European Court of Justice in 2006 that suspended the application of controlled foreign corporation (CFC) rules within the European Economic Area. It closed with a subsequent piece of anti-shifting legislation on thin capitalization in 2007. We identify causal effects of the suspension of the CFC rules on profit shifting by exploiting random variation in the size of MNEs’ windows that results from variation in the business year starting dates across MNEs. Using detailed balance sheet information on internal debt shifting between foreign low tax subsidiaries and their parents, we find that MNEs’ response to the window of opportunity is remarkably moderate in terms of both the probability and the volume of internal lending. On the one hand, this results from substantial short-term rigidities: internal lending increases with window size. On the other hand, MNEs in general responded with a fair amount of reserve which is indicated by low total levels of internal lending throughout the window. Presumably, this is caused by legal uncertainty about the scope of internal debt shifting that would be accepted by tax offices.