{"title":"病耻感和自尊","authors":"K. Lippert‐Rasmussen","doi":"10.1093/oso/9780190648787.003.0009","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This chapter looks at the objection that the intended beneficiaries of affirmative action are harmed through its stigmatizing effects and, thus, that affirmative action is self-defeating. It offers three main reasons why this objection is weak. First, it seems likely that stigma is not merely a matter of rational statistical inferences but also a matter of irrational processes such as implicit bias, the sheer numbers effect, etc. Second, much stigma is likely to reflect epistemic injustice, e.g. recipients of affirmative action are likely to suffer from comparative and non-comparative epistemic injustice in the form of overgeneralizations to a higher degree than other groups. Hence, the stigma objection provides no objection to affirmative action schemes that also involve means to eliminate the relevant epistemic injustice. This relates to the chapter’s third point, which is that affirmative action policies can be part of a larger package of policies that, taken as a whole, is immune to the stigma objection.","PeriodicalId":365406,"journal":{"name":"Making Sense of Affirmative Action","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2020-04-23","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Stigma and self-esteem\",\"authors\":\"K. Lippert‐Rasmussen\",\"doi\":\"10.1093/oso/9780190648787.003.0009\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This chapter looks at the objection that the intended beneficiaries of affirmative action are harmed through its stigmatizing effects and, thus, that affirmative action is self-defeating. It offers three main reasons why this objection is weak. First, it seems likely that stigma is not merely a matter of rational statistical inferences but also a matter of irrational processes such as implicit bias, the sheer numbers effect, etc. Second, much stigma is likely to reflect epistemic injustice, e.g. recipients of affirmative action are likely to suffer from comparative and non-comparative epistemic injustice in the form of overgeneralizations to a higher degree than other groups. Hence, the stigma objection provides no objection to affirmative action schemes that also involve means to eliminate the relevant epistemic injustice. This relates to the chapter’s third point, which is that affirmative action policies can be part of a larger package of policies that, taken as a whole, is immune to the stigma objection.\",\"PeriodicalId\":365406,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Making Sense of Affirmative Action\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-04-23\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Making Sense of Affirmative Action\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190648787.003.0009\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Making Sense of Affirmative Action","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780190648787.003.0009","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
This chapter looks at the objection that the intended beneficiaries of affirmative action are harmed through its stigmatizing effects and, thus, that affirmative action is self-defeating. It offers three main reasons why this objection is weak. First, it seems likely that stigma is not merely a matter of rational statistical inferences but also a matter of irrational processes such as implicit bias, the sheer numbers effect, etc. Second, much stigma is likely to reflect epistemic injustice, e.g. recipients of affirmative action are likely to suffer from comparative and non-comparative epistemic injustice in the form of overgeneralizations to a higher degree than other groups. Hence, the stigma objection provides no objection to affirmative action schemes that also involve means to eliminate the relevant epistemic injustice. This relates to the chapter’s third point, which is that affirmative action policies can be part of a larger package of policies that, taken as a whole, is immune to the stigma objection.