DoSGuard:保护流水线mpsoc免受基于硬件木马的DoS攻击

Amin Malekpour, R. Ragel, A. Ignjatović, S. Parameswaran
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引用次数: 10

摘要

一个芯片上的数十亿个晶体管和电源墙使得嵌入式系统被设计成多处理器片上系统(MPSoC)架构。mpsoc的一种应用是流水线mpsoc (pmpsoc)。由于许多可靠和安全的关键系统都部署了mpsoc,拒绝它们的服务将会产生不利影响。其中一种可能性是插入执行拒绝服务(DoS)攻击的硬件木马。DoSGuard提出了一种新颖的PMPSoC架构,可以在第三方知识产权(3PIP)内核中存在DoS木马的情况下继续执行。DoSGuard部署了两种方法:一个可以检测木马的存在并进行恢复,另一个还可以使用缓冲延迟识别受到攻击的3pip。目前采用的是3倍的面积和功耗开销,而DoSGuard的功耗是1.5M+3的面积和泄漏功率(M为基础系统的核数),动态功耗很小(监控系统的功耗)。在周期精确的商用多处理器模拟器上,DoSGuard检测一次DoS攻击需要531个时钟周期。使用DoSGuard,由于DoS攻击而导致的吞吐量减少随应用程序和监控间隔而变化,但对于发生数百万次迭代的真实世界场景来说可以忽略不计(< 10 - 3%)。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
DoSGuard: Protecting pipelined MPSoCs against hardware Trojan based DoS attacks
Billions of transistors on a chip and the power wall made embedded systems to be designed with Multiprocessor System-on-Chip (MPSoC) architectures. One utilization of MPSoCs is the Pipelined MPSoCs (PMPSoCs). As many reliable and safety critical systems are deployed with MPSoCs, denying their service would have adverse effects. One such possibility is the insertion of a hardware Trojan that performs Denial of Service (DoS) attacks. DoSGuard present a novel PMPSoC architecture that continues its execution in the presence of DoS Trojans in Third Party Intellectual Property (3PIP) cores. DoSGuard deploys two methods; one can detect the presence of Trojans and recover, and the other can also identify the 3PIPs under attack using buffer delays. While the state of the art incurs 3× area and power overheads, DoSGuard consumes 1.5M+3 area and leakage power (M is the number of cores in the base system) and a small (the power consumption of the monitoring system) dynamic power overheads. On a cycle accurate commercial multiprocessor simulator, DoSGuard takes 531 clock cycles to detect a DoS attack. With DoSGuard the throughput reduction due to a DoS attack varies with the application and the monitoring interval but is negligible (< 10−3%) for real world scenarios, where millions of iterations take place.
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