{"title":"莱布尼茨原理与心理-神经同一性","authors":"A. Bottani, A. Paternoster","doi":"10.5040/9781350066359.0018","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Can the Leibnizian principle of the indiscernibility of identicals be used as an argument against the psych-neural type identity, that is, against the theory according to which mental propertiens are nothing but neural properties? We argue that (1) Leibniz's law cannot provide a reason to reject the identity theory and (2) it makes very hard to distinguish between two different versions of the psycho-neural identity theory, the weaker 'token identity' theory and the stronger 'type identity' theory.","PeriodicalId":151770,"journal":{"name":"Natural and Artifactual Objects in Contemporary Metaphysics","volume":"1 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"1900-01-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Leibniz’s Principle and Psycho-Neural Identity\",\"authors\":\"A. Bottani, A. Paternoster\",\"doi\":\"10.5040/9781350066359.0018\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Can the Leibnizian principle of the indiscernibility of identicals be used as an argument against the psych-neural type identity, that is, against the theory according to which mental propertiens are nothing but neural properties? We argue that (1) Leibniz's law cannot provide a reason to reject the identity theory and (2) it makes very hard to distinguish between two different versions of the psycho-neural identity theory, the weaker 'token identity' theory and the stronger 'type identity' theory.\",\"PeriodicalId\":151770,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Natural and Artifactual Objects in Contemporary Metaphysics\",\"volume\":\"1 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"1900-01-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Natural and Artifactual Objects in Contemporary Metaphysics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.5040/9781350066359.0018\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Natural and Artifactual Objects in Contemporary Metaphysics","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5040/9781350066359.0018","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Can the Leibnizian principle of the indiscernibility of identicals be used as an argument against the psych-neural type identity, that is, against the theory according to which mental propertiens are nothing but neural properties? We argue that (1) Leibniz's law cannot provide a reason to reject the identity theory and (2) it makes very hard to distinguish between two different versions of the psycho-neural identity theory, the weaker 'token identity' theory and the stronger 'type identity' theory.
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