重组公司治理:工会的股东行动主义

Stewart J. Schwab, Randall S. Thomas
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引用次数: 147

摘要

工会正积极利用其所有权推动公司治理改革。到目前为止,他们的大部分活动都是战术性的。如果工会发展出一种更具战略性的公司治理模式,公司治理就会发生持久的变化。一个战略模式将要求工会专注于他们与其他股东利益一致的领域,以及他们能够证明自己的行动将增加公司价值的领域。这就要求工会采取一个为股东和其他利益相关者以及工会自身实现长期增长最大化的平台。特别是,工会必须让其他股东相信,他们在公司和管理层运作方面拥有信息优势。如果工会能够向其他股东证明,它正在利用其监督优势采取行动,通过监管管理层的逃避行为和降低股权的代理成本来增加公司价值,那么其他股东将更愿意在未来的投票倡议中跟随它的领导。因此,工会股东有可能重新激活目前一些无效的公司治理体系。这些可能包括通过使用现有的诉讼技术来监管证券欺诈和其他类型的公司不当行为。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions
Labor unions are aggressively using their ownership power to push corporate-governance reforms. So far, much of their activity is tactical. Lasting changes in corporate governance can occur if unions develop a more strategic model of their role in corporate governance. A stretegic model would require unions to concentrate on areas where their interests coincide with other shareholders and where they can demonstrte that their actions will increase firm value. This requires that labor unions adopt a platform of maximizing long-term growth for shareholders and other stakeholders, as well as for themselves. In particular, unions must convince other shareholders that they are acting in areas where they have an informational advantage about the corporation's and management's operations. If labor can demonstrate to other sharholders that it is using its monitoring advantagaes to take actions to increase firm value by policing management shirking and reducing the agency costs of equity, then other shareholders will be more willing to follow its lead in future voting initiatives. This opens up the possibility that labor union shareholders could reinvigorate some currently ineffectual corporate-governance systems. These might include the policing of securities fraud and other types of corporate misconduct through the use of existing litigation techniques.
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