权利

S. P. Garvey
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引用次数: 0

摘要

本章使用两个著名的最高法院案例——鲍威尔诉德克萨斯州案和莫里塞特诉美国案——来框定接下来的讨论。它提供了合理怀疑测试,作为每个公民自己决定对民主权威的限制是否合法的一种方式。它介绍了旨在通过这一检验的真实行为和行为目的的提法,使它们可以作为豁免权利,限制民主国家将罪行归责于被控犯罪的人的权力。它区分了现实行为和现实行为的传统理解(作为律师用来分析和剖析刑事法规要素的工具)和在这里的理解(作为豁免权利)。它解释了事实依据和行为实质是如何被理解的,当被告意识到他们在犯罪时是一回事,而当被告没有意识到他们在犯罪时又是另一回事。然后,它详细说明了善意是如何最终建立在病态或冷漠的意志上的——对法律及其目的缺乏足够的关注——并提出了一种测试(杰基尔测试),用于将病态和冷漠的遗嘱与守法的遗嘱区分开来。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Rights
This chapter uses two well-known Supreme Court cases—Powell v. Texas and Morissette v. United States—to frame the subsequent discussion. It offers the reasonable doubt test as a way for each citizen to decide for himself if a proposed limit on democratic authority is a legitimate limit. It introduces formulations of the actus reus and mens rea meant to pass that test, such that they can serve as immunity rights limiting the authority of a democratic states to ascribe guilt to those accused of crimes. It distinguishes actus reus and mens rea as they are conventionally understood (as tools lawyers use to analyze and dissect the elements of criminal statute) from how they will be understood here (as immunity rights). It explains how actus reus and mens rea so understood mean one thing when applied to defendants who realized they were committing a crime and another thing when they didn’t realize they were committing a crime. It then details how mens rea is ultimately grounded in an ill or indifferent will—a lack of sufficient concern for the law and its ends—and proposes a test (the Jekyll test) for sorting ill and indifferent wills from law-abiding ones.
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