Security Force Assistance Brigades and US Indo-Pacific Command Multi-domain Competition

Security force assistance brigades can enable multi-domain convergence in competition in the US Indo-Pacific Command. Rather than focusing on conventional Joint force capabilities, this article analyzes recent US Army operational experience in security force assistance and security cooperation in US Indo-Pacific Command and identifies capability gaps and opportunities for competition. Finally, military leadership and policymakers will f ind recommendations on how US Army security force assistance and security cooperation can shape environments and deter conflict in the US Indo-Pacific Command area of responsibility. K e y w o r d s : S FA B , m u l t i d o m a i n , c o m p e t i t i o n , d e t e r r e n c e , USINDOPACOM T US Indo-Pacific website states, “USINDOPACOM is committed to enhancing stability in the Asia-Pacific region by promoting security cooperation, encouraging peaceful development, responding to contingencies, deterring aggression, and, when necessary, fighting to win. This approach is based on partnership, presence, and military readiness.”1 In 2021, in the Interim United States National Security Strategic Guidance, President Joe Biden elevated the People’s Republic of China as the primary military threat to the United States.2 Consequently, the US military renewed its emphasis on competition within the US Indo-Pacific Command (USINDOPACOM) area of responsibility (AOR). As US strategic focus moves away from US Central Command following the conclusion of the Iraq and Afghanistan wars, the US Army must reassess its roles and look beyond its combat capabilities to aid in the success of the Joint force mission, specifically the operating environment of Indo-Pacific Command, to retain its relevance in the shifting strategic environment. Security force assistance brigades (SFABs) can play a crucial role due to doctrinal, organizational, and extensive specialized training capabilities 1. “About United States Indo-Pacific Command,” PACOM, n.d., accessed October 23, 2022, https://www.pacom.mil/About-USINDOPACOM/. 2. Joseph R. Biden Jr., Interim National Security Strategic Guidance, March 2021 (Washington, DC: White House, 2021): 8. 44 Parameters 52(4) Winter 2022–23 in partner integration. Since the Indo-Pacific’s strategic and operational environments lie primarily in the air and maritime domains, security force assistance brigades could play a vital role in enabling convergence and synchronizing cross-domain effects by cognition and effort beyond physical mass within multi-domain competition. Integrating brigades with partnered foreign security forces will allow the US Army to leverage partner multi-domain capabilities in complementary ways to US Joint and interagency capabilities and achieve a relative advantage in regional competition. This article considers roles security force assistance brigades can fill to enable combined multi-domain convergence in competition below the threshold of armed conflict. It examines current military problems in the Indo-Pacific, discusses how the brigades can address these problems, and provides recommendations for how to enable multi-domain competition. The Indo-Pacific Problem The central military problem in the Indo-Pacific Command is determining how the Joint force can maintain freedom of action and impose its will against peer adversaries in all domains to deter conflict while reestablishing a position of strategic advantage. The most effective and efficient way to do so is by retaining existing positions of advantage. While the air and maritime domains remain the main areas of focus in the Indo-Pacific, naval theorist Julian S. Corbett’s emphasis on the interdependence of the land and maritime domains suggests that retaining a Landpower advantage remains vital.3 The second military problem to avoid is losing the first battle of the next conflict.4 If North Korea attacked either Japan or South Korea, the Joint force would need to secure a swift initial victory to maintain its Landpower advantage. Chief of Staff of the Army General James C. McConville defines Landpower advantage as sustaining the fight, expanding the battlespace, striking in-depth across domains, gaining and maintaining decision dominance, creating overmatch, and prevailing in large-scale ground conflict.5 Given the Army’s considerable executive agent responsibilities in sustaining 3. Julian S. Corbett, Some Principles of Maritime Strategy (Harrisburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 1999). First published in 1918 by Longmans, Green. 4. Headquarters Department of the Army (HQDA), Army Multi-Domain Transformation: Ready to Win in Competition and Conflict, Chief of Staff Paper #1 (Washington, DC: HQDA, 2021), 5. 5. HQDA, Multi-Domain Transformation, 6. Indo-Pacific Pelham 45 the Joint force, integrating partner sustainment capabilities toward the goal of convergence is beneficial and critical to success. In Asia-Pacif ic: A Strategic Assessment, David Lai warns of the danger of overplaying the “U.S. card” in pursuing an over-militarized strategy to influence territorial interests in the Indo-Pacific region, and Lai underscores the peril of provoking China into reckless actions that risk moving from competition into open conflict.6 To mitigate this risk and achieve bilateral solutions, Lai recommends a strategic approach that reinforces the diplomatic and economic elements of national power coupled with a smaller military footprint.7 Large, conventional forward-postured US forces could have a provocative rather than coercive or deterrent strategic effect. Embedded adviser forces partnered with East Asian security forces can enable similar combined multi-domain convergence and keep efforts in the competition sphere instead of conflict. A RAND Corporation study on security force assistance brigades in Afghanistan conducted by Leslie Adrienne Payne and Jan Osburg illustrates potential capability gaps in the Indo-Pacific and highlights issues that could result from employing conventional Joint forces trained and organized for “highly-kinetic” operations in advise and assist roles.8 The employment of large, conventional forces in adviser roles violates economy of force by compelling a unit to execute a mission for which it is not equipped, organized, or trained while underutilizing its capabilities. Instead, Payne and Osburg recommend using specifically trained conventional advisers to assist forces in enabling partner contribution. They note US operations in Afghanistan caused a marked increase in “morale and enthusiasm” among partnered forces operating with dedicated adviser forces rather than conventional advisers.9 Payne and Osburg also underscore the importance of influencing two to three countries at once by employing dispersed military organizations more efficiently than conventional Joint forces.10 The ability to influence multiple actors across a large, noncontiguous area of responsibility like the Indo-Pacific is necessary for maximizing Army support to the air and maritime domains. Also, Payne and Osburg suggest that, while it is sensible to align adviser forces regionally for continuity of partner relationships, conventional Joint 6. David Lai, Asia-Pacific: A Strategic Assessment (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College Press, 2013), iv, https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/527/. 7. Lai, Asia-Pacific, v. 8. Leslie Adrienne Payne and Jan Osburg, Leveraging Observations of Security Force Assistance in Afghanistan for Global Operations (Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation, 2013), 12. 9. Payne and Osburg, Security Force Assistance, 12. 10. Payne and Osburg, Security Force Assistance, 14. 46 Parameters 52(4) Winter 2022–23 forces are ill-suited for perpetual regional alignment due to global demand for their aid and their limited multi-domain capabilities.11 Applicability to the Indo-Pacific Problem The idea of the US Army reexamining roles in anticipation of a strategic and operational shift from counterinsurgency operations originating in US Central Command to competing with the People’s Republic of China, Russia, and other global powers in the Indo-Pacific region is not a recent development. As early as 2006, the US Army strategic planning guidance outlined the need to prepare for a post-global war on terrorism strategic and operational environment shift: “We must immediately begin the process of re-examining and challenging our most basic institutional assumptions, organizational structures, paradigms, policies, and procedures to better serve our Nation. The end result of this examination will be a more relevant and ready force—a campaign quality Army with a Joint and Expeditionary Mindset.”12 To maintain the Army’s competitive advantage in the Indo-Pacific, leadership must recognize the importance of enduring partner integration.13 Security force assistance brigades represent a tailored, specifically trained unit large enough to manifest the full range of partner capability. At the same time, they are small enough to avoid strategically provocative connotations associated with larger forward-postured conventional forces, making the brigades ideal for the Army’s shift to the Indo-Pacific and supporting partners to compete below the threshold of armed conflict. Given that “joint interdependence is potentially the Joint Team’s greatest asset,” the Army Strategic Planning Guidance 2006-2023 suggests the best opportunity to support the Joint force in the Indo-Pacific lies in “reassuring friends, allies, and coalition partners” to dissuade and deter adversaries.14 In preserving a rules-based international order favorable to the United States and its allies, the Army possesses the unique ability to build cohesive and enduring teams among allies and partners. Integrating partner capabilities to “sense, understand, decide, and act faster than an adversary in any situation” requires Army adviser forces to enable the execution of “simultaneous and sequential operations distributed throughout a non-linear battle