理性化和认知优先顺序

Emiliano Catonini
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引用次数: 7

摘要

在动态游戏开始时,玩家可能对对手的玩法有外生理论。假设这些理论是众所周知的。然后,玩家将完善自己的第一阶信念,并通过战略推理挑战自己的理论。我在认识论上发展并描述了一个新的解决方案概念,即选择性理性化(Selective Rationalizability),它在以下假设下完成了这项任务:当观察到的行为与参与者的理性信念和所有顺序的理论不相容时,参与者保留与观察到的行为本身相容的理性信念顺序,并放弃理论中不相容的信念。因此,选择性理性化抓住了理性的共同强烈信念(Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2002),并完善了广泛形式的理性化(Pearce, 1984;BS, 2002),而Strong-$\Delta$- rationizability (Battigalli, 2003;Battigalli和Siniscalchi, 2003)抓住了相反的认知优先选择。选择性合理化可以扩展到包含更丰富的认知优先顺序在不同的理论对手的行为。这使得与战略稳定建立了令人惊讶的联系(Kohlberg和Mertens, 1986)。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Rationalizability and Epistemic Priority Orderings
At the beginning of a dynamic game, players may have exogenous theories about how the opponents are going to play. Suppose that these theories are commonly known. Then, players will refine their first-order beliefs, and challenge their own theories, through strategic reasoning. I develop and characterize epistemically a new solution concept, Selective Rationalizability, which accomplishes this task under the following assumption: when the observed behavior is not compatible with the beliefs in players' rationality and theories of all orders, players keep the orders of belief in rationality that are per se compatible with the observed behavior, and drop the incompatible beliefs in the theories. Thus, Selective Rationalizability captures Common Strong Belief in Rationality (Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2002) and refines Extensive-Form Rationalizability (Pearce, 1984; BS, 2002), whereas Strong-$\Delta$-Rationalizability (Battigalli, 2003; Battigalli and Siniscalchi, 2003) captures the opposite epistemic priority choice. Selective Rationalizability can be extended to encompass richer epistemic priority orderings among different theories of opponents' behavior. This allows to establish a surprising connection with strategic stability (Kohlberg and Mertens, 1986).
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