{"title":"关系契约和工作设计","authors":"Anja Schöttner","doi":"10.2139/ssrn.856906","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper analyzes the problem of optimal job design when there is only one contractible and imperfect performance measure for all tasks whose contribution to firm value is non-veritable. I find that task splitting is optimal when relational contracts based on firm value are not feasible. By contrast, if an agent who performs a given set of tasks receives an implicit bonus, the principal always benefits from assigning an additional task to this agent.","PeriodicalId":357008,"journal":{"name":"Employment Law eJournal","volume":"10 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2006-07-05","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"7","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Relational Contracts and Job Design\",\"authors\":\"Anja Schöttner\",\"doi\":\"10.2139/ssrn.856906\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper analyzes the problem of optimal job design when there is only one contractible and imperfect performance measure for all tasks whose contribution to firm value is non-veritable. I find that task splitting is optimal when relational contracts based on firm value are not feasible. By contrast, if an agent who performs a given set of tasks receives an implicit bonus, the principal always benefits from assigning an additional task to this agent.\",\"PeriodicalId\":357008,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Employment Law eJournal\",\"volume\":\"10 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2006-07-05\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"7\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Employment Law eJournal\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.856906\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Employment Law eJournal","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.856906","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper analyzes the problem of optimal job design when there is only one contractible and imperfect performance measure for all tasks whose contribution to firm value is non-veritable. I find that task splitting is optimal when relational contracts based on firm value are not feasible. By contrast, if an agent who performs a given set of tasks receives an implicit bonus, the principal always benefits from assigning an additional task to this agent.
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