{"title":"多进程的恶意软件","authors":"M. Ramilli, M. Bishop, Shining Sun","doi":"10.1109/MALWARE.2011.6112320","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Malware behavior detectors observe the behavior of suspected malware by emulating its execution or executing it in a sandbox or other restrictive, instrumented environment. This assumes that the process, or process family, being monitored will exhibit the targeted behavior if it contains malware. We describe a technique for evading such detection by distributing the malware over multiple processes. We then present a method for countering this technique, and present results of tests that validate our claims.","PeriodicalId":375300,"journal":{"name":"2011 6th International Conference on Malicious and Unwanted Software","volume":"63 1","pages":"0"},"PeriodicalIF":0.0000,"publicationDate":"2011-10-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"29","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Multiprocess malware\",\"authors\":\"M. Ramilli, M. Bishop, Shining Sun\",\"doi\":\"10.1109/MALWARE.2011.6112320\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Malware behavior detectors observe the behavior of suspected malware by emulating its execution or executing it in a sandbox or other restrictive, instrumented environment. This assumes that the process, or process family, being monitored will exhibit the targeted behavior if it contains malware. We describe a technique for evading such detection by distributing the malware over multiple processes. We then present a method for countering this technique, and present results of tests that validate our claims.\",\"PeriodicalId\":375300,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"2011 6th International Conference on Malicious and Unwanted Software\",\"volume\":\"63 1\",\"pages\":\"0\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.0000,\"publicationDate\":\"2011-10-18\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"29\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"2011 6th International Conference on Malicious and Unwanted Software\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1109/MALWARE.2011.6112320\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"\",\"JCRName\":\"\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"2011 6th International Conference on Malicious and Unwanted Software","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1109/MALWARE.2011.6112320","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"","JCRName":"","Score":null,"Total":0}
Malware behavior detectors observe the behavior of suspected malware by emulating its execution or executing it in a sandbox or other restrictive, instrumented environment. This assumes that the process, or process family, being monitored will exhibit the targeted behavior if it contains malware. We describe a technique for evading such detection by distributing the malware over multiple processes. We then present a method for countering this technique, and present results of tests that validate our claims.