Pietro Spadaccino, D. Garlisi, F. Cuomo, Giorgio Pillon, Patrizio Pisani
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引用次数: 8
摘要
LoRaWAN (Long Range WAN)是物联网(IoT)的新兴技术之一。许多物联网应用涉及简单的设备,这些设备将数据传输到网络网关或接入点,进而将数据重定向到应用服务器。虽然LoRaWAN v1.1规范从一开始就面临着一些安全问题,但仍有一些方面可能会破坏物联网设备的隐私和安全性。本文主要研究LoRaWAN设备身份认证中的隐私问题。该方法通过监测LoRaWAN网络的流量,能够以概率方式从网络分配的时间地址中导出设备的唯一标识符。也就是说,该方法识别了LoRaWAN DevAddress与设备制造商DevEUI之间的关系。提出的方法名为DEVIL(设备识别和隐私泄漏),它基于LoRaWAN设备在数据包传输中产生的时间模式,并在意大利网络运营商部署的真实应用场景中提取的数据集上进行了评估。我们的分析结果表明,在此期间,设备识别如何使用户暴露于隐私泄露。
Discovery privacy threats via device de-anonymization in LoRaWAN
LoRaWAN (Long Range WAN) is one of the well-known emerging technologies for the Internet of Things (IoT). Many IoT applications involve simple devices that transmit their data toward network gateways or access points that, in turn, redirect the data to application servers. While several security issues have been faced in the LoRaWAN v1.1 specification from the very beginning, there are still some aspects that may undermine the privacy and the security of the IoT devices. In this paper we tackle the privacy aspect in the LoRaWAN device identity. The proposed approach, by monitoring the traffic of a LoRaWAN Network, is able to derive, in a probabilistic way, the unique identifier of the device from the temporal address assigned from the network. In other words, the method identifies the relationship between the LoRaWAN DevAddress and the device manufacturer DevEUI. The proposed approach, named DEVIL (DEVice Identification and privacy Leakage), is based on temporal patterns arising in the packet transmissions by LoRaWAN devices, and it is evaluated on the dataset extracted from real applications scenario deployed in Italy by a network operator. The results of our analysis show how device identification, during the time, can expose users to privacy leakage.